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BRINKIBON LTD v STAHAG UND STAHL WAREN HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT MbH (1983) 2 AC 34

HOUSE OF LORDS

 

BRINKIBON LTD v STAHAG UND STAHL WAREN HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT MbH (1983) 2 AC 34

 

January 21 1982

 

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LORD WILBERFORCE:

 

… With a general rule covering instantaneous communication inter praesentes [face to face - Editor], or at a distance, with an exception applying to non-instantaneous communication at a distance, how should communications by telex be categorised? In Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp the Court of Appeal classified them with instantaneous communications. Their ruling…appears not to have caused either adverse comment, or any difficulty to businessmen. I would accept it as a general rule. Where the condition of simultaneity is met, and where it appears to be within the mutual intention of the parties that contractual exchanges should take place in this way, I think it a sound rule, but not necessarily a universal rule.

 

Since 1955 the use of telex communication has been greatly expanded, and there are many variants on it. The senders and recipients may not be the principals to the contemplated contract. They may be servants or agents with limited authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to reach, the designated recipient immediately: messages may be sent out of office hours, or at night, with the intention, or on the assumption, that they will be read at a later time. There may be some error or default at the recipient’s end which prevents receipt at the time contemplated and believed in by the sender. The message may have been sent and/or received through machines operated by third persons. And many other variations may occur. No universal rule can cover all such cases; they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business practice and in some cases by a judgment where the risks should lie …

 

The present case is, as Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp itself, the simple case of instantaneous communication between principals, and, in accordance with the general rule, involves that the contract (if any) was made when and where the acceptance was received. This was … in Vienna.

 

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LORD WILBERFORCE:

 

My Lords, the appellants desire to sue in this country the respondents, an Austrian company, for breach of an alleged contract for the supply of steel. In order to do so, they must obtain leave to serve notice of their writ upon the respondents under one or other of the provisions of R.S.C., Ord. 11, r. 1 (1). Those relied upon are paragraphs (f) and (g). To satisfy (f), the appellants must show that the contract was ‘made within the jurisdiction’; to come within (g) they must establish that the action is in respect of a breach committed within the jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal has decided against the appellants under both paragraphs.

 

The question whether a contract was made within the jurisdiction will often admit of a simple answer: if both parties are in England at the time of making it, or if it is contained in a single document signed by both parties in England, there is no difficulty. But in the case of contracts involving negotiations, where one party is abroad, the answer may be difficult to find. Sophisticated analysis may be required to decide when the last counter-offer was made into a contract by acceptance, or at what point a clear consensus was reached and by virtue of what words spoken or of what conduct. In the case of successive telephone conversations it may indeed be most artificial to ask where the contract was made: if one asked the parties, they might say they did not know – or care. The place of making a contract is usually irrelevant as regards validity, or interpretation, or enforcement. Unfortunately it remains in Order 11 as a test for purposes of jurisdiction, and courts have to do their best with it.

 

In the present case it seems that if there was a contract (a question which can only be decided at the trial), it was preceded by and possibly formed by a number of telephone conversations and telexes between London and Vienna. and there are a number of possible combinations upon which reliance can be placed. At this stage we must take the alternatives which provide reasonable evidence of a contract in order to see if the test is satisfied. There are two: (i) A telex dated May 3, 1979, from the respondents in Vienna, said to amount to a counter-offer, followed by a telex from the appellants in London to the respondents in Vienna dated May 4, 1979, said to amount to an acceptance. (ii) The above telex dated May 3, 1979, from the respondents followed by action, by way of opening a letter of credit, said to have amounted to an acceptance by conduct.

 

The first of these alternatives neatly raises the question whether an acceptance by telex sent from London but received in Vienna causes a contract to be made in London, or in Vienna. If the acceptance had been sent by post, or by telegram, then, on existing authorities, it would have been complete when put into the hands of the post office – in London. If on the other hand it had been telephoned, it would have been complete when heard by the offeror – in Vienna. So in which category is a telex communication to be placed? Existing authority of the Court of Appeal decides in favour of the latter category, i.e. a telex is to be assimilated to other methods of instantaneous communication: see Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 Q.B. 327. The appellants ask that this case, which has stood for 30 years, should now be reviewed.

 

Now such review as is necessary must be made against the background of the law as to the making of contracts. The general rule, it is hardly necessary to state, is that a contract is formed when acceptance of an offer is communicated by the offeree to the offeror. and if it is necessary to determine where a contract is formed (as to which I have already commented) it appears logical that this should be at the place where acceptance is communicated to the offeror. In the common case of contracts, whether oral or in writing inter praesentes, there is no difficulty; and again logic demands that even where there is not mutual presence at the same place and at the same time, if communication is instantaneous, for example by telephone or radio communication, the same result should follow.

 

Then there is the case – very common – of communication at a distance, to meet which the so called ‘postal rule’ has developed. I need not trace its history: it has firmly been in the law at least since Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 1 B. & Ald. 681. The rationale for it, if left somewhat obscure by Lord Ellenborough C.J., has since been well explained. Mellish L.J. in In re Imperial Land Co. of Marseilles (Harris’ Case) (1872) L.R. 7 Ch.App. 587, 594 ascribed it to the extraordinary and mischievous consequences which would follow if it were held that an offer might be revoked at any time until the letter accepting it had been actually received: and its foundation in convenience was restated by Thesiger L.J. in Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Grant (1879) 4 Ex.D. 216, 223. In these cases too it seems logical to say that the place, as well as the time, of acceptance should be where (as when) the acceptance is put into the charge of the post office.

 

In this situation, with a general rule covering instantaneous communication inter praesentes, or at a distance, with an exception applying to non- instantaneous communication at a distance, how should communications by telex be categorised? In Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 Q.B. 327 the Court of Appeal classified them with instantaneous communications. Their ruling, which has passed into the textbooks, including Williston on Contracts, 3rd ed. (1957), appears not to have caused either adverse comment, or any difficulty to business men. I would accept it as a general rule. Where the condition of simultaneity is met, and where it appears to be within the mutual intention of the parties that contractual exchanges should take place in this way, I think it a sound rule, but not necessarily a universal rule.

 

Since 1955 the use of telex communication has been greatly expanded, and there are many variants on it. The senders and recipients may not be the principals to the contemplated contract. They may be servants or agents with limited authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to reach, the designated recipient immediately: messages may be sent out of office hours, or at night, with the intention, or upon the assumption, that they will be read at a later time. There may be some error or default at the recipient’s end which prevents receipt at the time contemplated and believed in by the sender. The message may have been sent and/or received through machines operated by third persons. and many other variations may occur. No universal rule can cover all such cases: they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business practice and in some cases by a judgment where the risks should lie: see Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Grant, 4 Ex.D. 216, 227 per Baggallay L.J. and Henthorn v. Fraser [1892] 2 Ch. 27 per Lord Herschell.

 

The present case is, as Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 Q.B. 327 itself, the simple case of instantaneous communication between principals, and, in accordance with the general rule, involves that the contract (if any) was made when and where the acceptance was received. This was on May 4, 1979, in Vienna.

 

The alternative argument under this head was that the contract was made by an offer made from Vienna (as above, on May 3, 1979) and an acceptance by conduct in the United Kingdom. The conduct relied upon was the giving of instructions by the appellants to set up a letter of credit, as requested in the respondents’ telex of May 3, 1979. The appellants’ telex of May 4, 1979, opened with the words ‘confirm having opened our irrevocable letter of credit No. 0761/79 on account of Mide-strade Est., Chiasso, Switzerland …’ Mide-strade Est. is, it appears, the company behind the appellants – a fact which raises the question whether a letter of credit on their account satisfied the terms of the respondents’ request. I need not come to a conclusion on this point because I am satisfied that the letter of credit was not opened in the United Kingdom. Instructions were indeed given by the appellants to their bank in the United Kingdom to open it, and that bank gave instructions on May 4, 1979, to their correspondent in Vienna, but these steps were between the appellants and their agents only. They could not amount, in my opinion, to an acceptance of the offer of May 3, 1979. This took place, if at all, when the correspondent bank in Vienna notified the respondents: this they did in Vienna. On neither ground, therefore, can it be said that the contract was made within the jurisdiction and the case under subparagraph (f) must fail.

 

That under subparagraph (g) can be more shortly dealt with. The breach pleaded is that the defendants (respondents) ‘have not opened a performance bond and have delivered no steel’ (points of claim paragraph 7). Each of these acts should have been performed outside the jurisdiction and failure to do them must be similarly located.

 

On both points, therefore, I find myself in agreement with the Court of Appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed.

 

LORD FRASER OF TULLYBELTON:

 

My Lords, I am in full agreement with the reasoning of my noble and learned friends, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Brandon of Oakbrook. I wish only to add a comment on the subject of where a contract is made, when it is made by an offer accepted by telex between parties in different countries. The question is whether acceptance by telex falls within the general rule that it requires to be notified to the offeror in order to be binding, or within the exception of the postal rule whereby it becomes binding when (and where) it is handed over to the post office. The posting rule is based on considerations of practical convenience, arising from the delay that is inevitable in delivering a letter. But it has been extended to apply to telegrams sent through the post office, and in strict logic there is much to be said for applying it also to telex messages sent by one business firm directly to another. There is very little, if any, difference in the mechanics of transmission between a private telex from one business office to another, and a telegram sent through the post office – especially one sent from one large city to another. Even the element of delay will not be greatly different in the typical case where the operator of the recipient’s telex is a clerk with no authority to conclude contracts, who has to hand it to his principal. In such a case a telex message is not in fact received instantaneously by the responsible principal. I assume that the present case is a case of that sort.

 

Nevertheless I have reached the opinion that, on balance, an acceptance sent by telex directly from the acceptor’s office to the offeror’s office should be treated as if it were an instantaneous communication between principals, like a telephone conversation. One reason is that the decision to that effect in Entores v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 Q.B. 327 seems to have worked without leading to serious difficulty or complaint from the business community. Secondly, once the message has been received on the offeror’s telex machine, it is not unreasonable to treat it as delivered to the principal offeror, because it is his responsibility to arrange for prompt handling of messages within his own office. Thirdly, a party (the acceptor) who tries to send a message by telex can generally tell if his message has not been received on the other party’s (the offeror’s) machine, whereas the offeror, of course, will not know if an unsuccessful attempt has been made to send an acceptance to him. It is therefore convenient that the acceptor, being in the better position, should have the responsibility of ensuring that his message is received. For these reasons I think it is right that in the ordinary simple case, such as I take this to be, the general rule and not the postal rule should apply. But I agree with both my noble and learned friends that the general rule will not cover all the many variations that may occur with telex messages.

 

LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN:

 

My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speeches prepared by my noble and learned friends, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Brandon of Oakbrook. I agree with them and accordingly I too would dismiss this appeal.

 

LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH:

 

My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speeches of my noble and learned friends, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Brandon of Oakbrook. I agree with them that, for the reasons they give, this appeal should be dismissed.

 

LORD BRANDON OF OAKBROOK:

 

My Lords, both the appellants (whom I shall call ‘the buyers’) and the respondents (whom I shall call ‘the sellers’) are traders in steel. The buyers are an English company. The sellers are an Austrian company, having no place of business in England or Wales.

 

It is common ground between the buyers and the sellers that early in May 1979, following negotiations which began in April 1979, an executory contract was made between them for the sale by the sellers to the buyers of a quantity of mild steel bars. It is further common ground that, in circumstances which I shall explain later, that executory contract (which I shall call ‘the contract ‘) was never performed.

 

On November 30, 1979, a considerable time after performance of the contract should, according to its terms, have been completed, the buyers applied ex parte to Robert Goff J. in the Commercial Court for leave to issue a writ against the sellers claiming damages for breach of the contract, and to serve notice of such writ on the sellers out of the jurisdiction in Austria. The application was supported by an affidavit of Mr. Jackson, a partner in the firm of solicitors acting for the buyers, and the learned judge made the order which he was asked to make. Pursuant to that order, the buyers issued a writ against the sellers indorsed on the back with points of claim, and served notice of such writ on the sellers in Austria.

 

On March 11, 1980, Mocatta J. in the Commercial Court dismissed an application by the sellers, who had meanwhile entered a conditional appearance in the action, to set aside the service on them of notice of the writ in Austria.

 

The sellers appealed against the decision of Mocatta J. and by order of June 12, 1980, the Court of Appeal (Stephenson and Templeman L.JJ.) allowed the appeal and set aside both the order of Robert Goff J. of November 30, 1979, and that of Mocatta J. of March 11, 1980. The Court of Appeal refused an application by the buyers to present a petition of appeal to your Lordships’ House, but leave for them to do so was later given by the Appeal Committee.

 

There are two grounds on which the buyers relied in the courts below, and continued to rely in your Lordships’ House, for their contention that this was a proper case for service out of the jurisdiction in Austria under R.S.C., Ord. 11, r. 1 (1). The first ground was that the case came within paragraph (f) of rule 1 (1) because the action begun by the writ was brought against the sellers to recover damages in respect of a contract which was made in England. The second ground was that the case came within paragraph (g) of rule 1 (1) because the action begun by the writ was brought against the sellers in respect of a breach of contract committed in England. Robert Goff J. appears to have accepted both grounds. Mocatta J. accepted the first ground but rejected the second. The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds.

 

My Lords, the negotiations between the parties which led up to the making of the contract were conducted, in the main at any rate, by telex. I say ‘in the main’ because there is some evidence, contained in the affidavit of Mr. Jackson, to which I referred earlier, that there were also some telephone conversations between representatives of the parties relating to the matter. There was, however, no evidence to show what was said in the course of any such telephone conversations and no significance can therefore be attached to them.

 

There were six telexes leading up to making of the contract: four from the buyers to the sellers, sent on April 20, April 23, April 26 and May 4, 1979; and two from the sellers to the buyers sent on April 25, and May 3, 1979. In the course of these telexes the principal terms of the contract were agreed as follows. First, the goods to be sold were to be 20,000 metric tons of mild steel bars of four different sizes. Secondly, the goods were to be delivered c. & f. Alexandria on liner terms. Thirdly, the price was to be U.S.$353 per metric ton. Fourthly, the goods were to be shipped in five separate instalments, each of 4,000 metric tons, in June, July, August, September and October 1979. Fifthly, payment of the price of each of the five instalments, namely, U.S.$1,412,000, was to be made by means of a letter of credit, revolving four times, which was to be operative at a named bank in Vienna. Sixthly, the following documents were to be presented against the letter of credit: a commercial invoice; a full set of clean bills of lading; a certificate of origin legalised by the Egyptian embassy or consulate; a blacklist certificate of the shipping company; a works certificate indicating the mechanical properties of the steel and that the bars were manufactured according ta British Standard Specification 4449/1969. Seventhly, the sellers were to provide a performance bond based on a percentage of the total price of U.S.$7,060,000. With regard to this the buyers first proposed that the percentage should be 5 per cent., but the sellers made a counterproposal of 3 per cent. which, since the buyers made no objection to it, appears to have been impliedly accepted by them. Eighthly, if the freight rates were to increase for the shipments in September and October, the buyers would repay such increase to the sellers. With regard to this too, the proposal came first from the sellers and, since the buyers made no objection ta it, appears again to have been impliedly accepted by them.

 

In their telex of May 3, 1979, the sellers named the Zentralsparkasse der Gemeinde bank in Vienna as the bank at which the buyers’ letter of credit was to be operative. Following receipt of that telex the buyers, on May 4, 1979, gave instructions to their London bank, as a result of which the latter sent to Osterreichische Landerbank, their correspondent bank in Vienna, a long telex which amounted either to a letter of credit, or at any rate to notice of a letter of credit, opened by a Swiss firm, Mide-strade Est., of Chiasso, in favour of the sellers in respect of the prices payable for the five instalments of steel bars the subject matter of the contract.

 

In the last paragraph but one of that telex the buyers’ London bank said:

 

‘This telex advice should be considered as a negotiable instrument. Please advise the above credit through Zentralsparkasse der Gemeinde, Wien, Vienna. Please also advise the beneficiaries about the arrival of credit on telephone.’

 

After giving those instructions to their London bank, the buyers on the same day, May 4, 1979, sent to the sellers a telex in these terms:

 

‘Confirm having opened our irrevocable letter of credit No. 0761/79 on account of Mide-strade Est., Chiasso, Switzerland, favouring yourselves for U.S. dlrs. 1,142,000 covering shipment of 4,000 m. tons rebars stop the credit is to revolve four times covering total shipment of 20,000 m. tons stop this credit has been advised through Osterreichische Landerbank (Wien).’

 

Mide-strade Est. of Chiasso in Switzerland were in fact principals on whose behalf the buyers, throughout their negotiations with the sellers, were acting as agents. The mention, however, of that Swiss firm’s name in the telexed letter of credit sent by the buyers’ London bank to their correspondent bank in Vienna, and in the telex from the buyers to the sellers set out above, constituted the first intimation to the sellers that a third party was involved in the contract on the buyers’ side.

 

On May 9, 1979, the sellers sent a telex to the buyers complaining that the letter of credit was unworkable and that it had been opened in the name not of the buyers but of a Swiss firm of whom the sellers knew nothing. On May 21, 1979, the sellers sent a further telex to the buyers in which they said, in effect, that they were withdrawing from the contract on the ground that they had not had opened in their favour a proper letter of credit under it. Further telexes were exchanged in which the buyers sought to persuade the sellers to change their minds and go on with the contract, but these efforts all failed. The result accordingly was that the contract was never performed.

 

My Lords, I shall consider first the buyers’ contention that the case comes within paragraph (f) of R.S.C., Ord. 11, r. 1 (1) , because the action begun by the writ was brought against the sellers to recover damages in respect of a contract which was made in England. In order to examine that contention it is necessary to consider the question when and where the negotiations between the buyer and the seller resulted in what both parties agree they did result in, namely, a concluded contract of sale.

 

In Mr. Jackson’s affidavit of November 21, 1979, in support of the buyers’ ex parte application to Robert Goff J. he stated in paragraph 4 that the contract came into being as the result of an offer by the buyers, contained in a telex sent by them to the sellers on April 26, 1979, being accepted by a telex sent by the sellers to the buyers on May 3, 1979. The manner in which the contract was made was pleaded in the same way in paragraph 4 of the buyers’ points of claim indorsed on the back of the writ.

 

Examination of the two telexes concerned does not support the buyers’ original case on how the contract was concluded. The buyers’ telex of April 26, 1979, is capable of being interpreted as an offer, but the sellers’ telex of May 3, 1979, cannot be interpreted as an acceptance of such offer, because it introduced terms which differed materially from those contained in the latter. In particular, the buyers in their telex of April 26, 1979, proposed a performance bond of 5 per cent. on the total purchase price, whereas the sellers in their telex of May 3, 1979, specified a performance bond of 3 per cent. The sellers further introduced an entirely new term, under which the buyers were to pay to the sellers any increase in freight charges in respect of the September and October shipments. In these circumstances the sellers’ telex of May 3 must, in accordance with well-established principles of the law of contract, be interpreted not as an acceptance of the buyers’ offer but as a counter-offer.

 

In your Lordships’ House, Mr. Thompson Q.C. for the buyers accepted, as I understood him, that the way in which the contract was said to have been made, first, in paragraph 4 of Mr. Jackson’s affidavit and, secondly, in paragraph 4 of the buyers’ points of claim, could not be supported. He recognised that the sellers’ telex of May 3 had to be interpreted as a counter-offer, and he put forward two alternative cases as to the manner in which that counter-offer was accepted by the buyers, either of which would, he said, produce the same result, namely, that acceptance took place, and the contract was therefore made, in England.

 

Mr. Thompson’s first contention was that the sellers’ counter-offer contained in their telex of May 3, 1979, was accepted by the buyers by their conduct on May 4, 1979, in instructing their London bank to open the required letter of credit operative in Vienna. His second and alternative contention was that the counter-offer was accepted by the buyers sending to the sellers their telex of May 4, 1979, which I quoted in full above.

 

In support of the first contention Mr. Thompson argued that the conduct of the buyers in giving the instructions concerned to their London bank took place in England, and that, since that conduct had the effect of concluding the contract, the contract was one made in England for the purposes of paragraph (f) of R.S.C., Ord. 11, r. 1 (1).

 

In support of his second and alternative contention, Mr. Thompson argued that, since the buyers’ telex of May 4, which resulted in the concluding of the contract, was sent by a representative of the buyers in London, once again the contract was one made in England for the purposes of paragraph (f) above.

 

My Lords, I do not consider that Mr. Thompson’s first contention, that the contract was concluded by the conduct of the buyers on May 4, 1979, in giving instructions to their London bank can possibly be right. It may be that when, as a result of those instructions, a letter of credit was opened operative at a bank in Vienna, and the sellers were then notified of that fact by that bank, such notification had the effect of bringing into being a concluded contract on the terms of the sellers’ telex of May 3, 1979. But the proposition that the mere giving by the buyers to their London bank of the instructions concerned, without any notification to the sellers of the fact that such instructions had been given, or of their nature and effect, could result in bringing into being a concluded contract appears to me to be quite untenable. On the other hand, if the contract was concluded as a result of a letter of credit operative at a bank in Vienna being opened, and the bank concerned then notifying the sellers of such opening, the contract so concluded would be one made in Austria and not in England.

 

Mr. Thompson’s second and alternative case, that the contract was concluded by the buyers transmitting to the sellers their telex of May 4, 1979, seems to me to be the correct analysis of the transaction. On this analysis, however, the buyers are up against the difficulty that it was decided by the Court of Appeal in Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 Q.B. 327 that, when an offer is accepted by telex, the contract thereby made is to be regarded as having been so made at the place where such telex was received (in this case Vienna) and not in the place from which such telex was sent (in this case London).

 

Mr. Thompson invited your Lordships to hold that the Entores case was wrongly decided and should therefore be overruled. In this connection he said that it was well-established law that, when acceptance of an offer was notified to an offeror by post or telegram, the concluding of the contract took place when and where the letter of acceptance was posted or the telegram of acceptance was despatched. He then argued that the same rule should apply to cases where the acceptance of an offer was communicated by telex, with the consequence that the contract so made should be regarded as having been made at the place from which the telex was sent and not the place where it was received.

 

My Lords, I am not persuaded that the Entores case [1955] 2 Q.B. 327, was wrongly decided and should therefore be overruled. On the contrary, I think that it was rightly decided and should be approved. The general principle of law applicable to the formation of a contract by offer and acceptance is that the acceptance of the offer by the offeree must be notified to the offeror before a contract can be regarded as concluded, Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] 1 Q.B. 256, 262, per Lindley L.J. The cases on acceptance by letter and telegram constitute an exception to the general principle of the law of contract stated above. The reason for the exception is commercial expediency: see, for example, Imperial Land Co. of Marseilles, In re (Harris’ Case) (1872) L.R. 7 Ch.App. 587, 692 per Mellish L.J. That reason of commercial expediency applies to cases where there is bound to be a substantial interval between the time when the acceptance is sent and the time when it is received. In such cases the exception to the general rule is more convenient, and makes on the whole for greater fairness, than the general rule itself would do. In my opinion, however, that reason of commercial expediency does not have any application when the means of communication employed between the offeror and the offeree is instantaneous in nature, as is the case when either the telephone or telex is used. In such cases the general principle relating to the formation of contracts remains applicable, with the result that the contract is made where and when the telex of acceptance is received by the offeror.

 

It follows from what I have said that, in my opinion, Mr. Thompson’s contention that the present case falls within paragraph (f) of R.S.C., Ord. 11, r. 1 (1), fails and must be rejected.

 

I turn to examine Mr. Thompson’s other contention that the present case falls within paragraph (g) of R.S.C., Ord. 11, r. 1 (1). In order to do this it is necessary to consider first what is the breach of the contract in respect of which the buyers’ action against the sellers was brought, and then to see whether such breach, assuming that it was committed, took place within or outside the jurisdiction.

 

This part of the case appears to have been conducted by both sides at every stage in the courts below as if the breach of the contract in respect of which the buyers’ action was brought consisted of an anticipatory breach in the form of a repudiation of the contract contained in the sellers’ telexes of May 9 and 21, 1979. As a result the question considered in the courts below was whether such repudiation took place in the country from which the telexes concerned were sent, namely, Austria, or in the country in which they were received, namely, England. Both Mocatta J. and the Court of Appeal took the view that the repudiation, and therefore the relevant breach of the contract, took place in Austria, the country from which the telexes concerned were sent.

 

In my view both sides, in conducting this part of the case on the basis described above, were acting under a complete misapprehension as to what was the breach of the contract in respect of which the buyers’ action was brought. That this is so becomes immediately apparent from the terms of paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the points of claim indorsed on the back of the writ.

 

Assuming, in favour of the buyers, that the sellers, by sending their telexes of May 9 and 21, repudiated the contract, a situation then arose in which the buyers were entitled to elect between two courses. They could either accept the repudiation and treat the contract as at an end; or they could decline to accept the repudiation and treat the contract as still subsisting. It is clear that, in that situation, the buyers elected to follow the second course and not the first.

 

I say that that is clear for four reasons. First, there is nowhere to be found in the documents put in evidence any telex or letter from the buyers to the sellers indicating that the former accepted the repudiation of the contract by the latter. Secondly, though reference is made in paragraph 6 of the buyers’ points of claim to the sellers’ two telexes of May 9 and 21, 1979, it is nowhere pleaded either that the sending of those telexes constituted a repudiation of the contract by the sellers, or that the buyers elected to accept such repudiation and treat the contract as at an end. Thirdly, the breach of the contract in fact pleaded in paragraph 7 of the points of claim is simply a failure by the sellers to perform the contract by opening a performance bond and delivering the steel. Fourthly, the damage alleged to have been suffered by the buyers in paragraph 8 of the points of claim is damage calculated by reference to the difference between the market and the contract prices of the steel at the time when the five instalments should, on the footing that the contract remained in force, have been delivered to the buyers.

 

Having regard to these matters the question to be considered in relation to paragraph (g) of R.S.C., Ord. 11, r. 1 (1) is not in what country did any alleged anticipatory repudiation of the contract by the sellers take place. The question is rather whether the sellers, on the assumption that they failed to perform any part of their obligations under the contract, thereby committed any breach of the contract in England. There is no difficulty in giving a negative answer to that question, for it has never been suggested that any part of the contract to be performed by the sellers was to be performed anywhere except outside the jurisdiction.

 

It follows from what I have said that, in my opinion, Mr. Thompson’s contention that the present case falls within paragraph (g) of R.S.C., Ord. 11, r. 1 (1) also fails and must be rejected.

 

My Lords, for the reasons which I have given, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal, though on different grounds in relation to paragraph (g), and dismiss the appeal.

 

Since preparing this speech I have had the advantage of reading in draft that of my noble and learned friend, Lord Wilberforce. In it he points out that, while the present case, like the Entores case [1955] 2 Q.B. 327, is concerned only with instantaneous communication by telex between the principals on either side, there may in other cases be a number of variations on that simple theme. He further expresses the view that there can be no general rule capable of covering all such variations, and that, when they occur, the problems posed by them must be resolved by reference to the intention of the parties, sound business practice and in some cases a judgment where the risk shall lie. I agree entirely with these observations.

BRIDLINGTON RELAY v YORKSHIRE ELECTRICITY BOARD [1965] 1 All ER 264

CHANCERY DIVISION

 

BRIDLINGTON RELAY v YORKSHIRE ELECTRICITY BOARD [1965] 1 All ER 264

 

1 December 1964

 

Full text

 

BUCKLEY J:

 

The plaintiffs in this action seek an injunction restraining the defendant board from committing a nuisance, which they apprehend that the defendants are about to commit of a kind, and in circumstances, which I shall describe. The plaintiffs carry on a business of providing for residents in Bridlington in the East Riding of Yorkshire a relay system of sound and television broadcasts. The defendants, the Yorkshire Electricity Board, are the area board responsible for the supply of electricity in the area in which Bridlington is situate. The plaintiffs fear that the operation of a power line recently erected by the defendants to the west and north of the town will cause electrical interference adversely affecting the reception of television at the plaintiffs’ aerial and so will damage the plaintiffs’ business.

..

If interference … were to recur at all frequently, it is very probable that the plaintiffs’ business would be damaged. If such damage were established, and it were shown that it would be likely to continue or recur, would the plaintiffs have a cause of action in nuisance? For the plaintiffs it is contended that to receive television is now an ordinary use of land and that causing radiation which results in preventing, or interfering with, the satisfactory reception of television transmissions is something which unwarrantably interferes with the legitimate and reasonable enjoyment of neighbouring property by its owners. It is said that, if that interference is of a sufficiently grave character, it may amount to an actionable nuisance on either or both of two grounds: viz, that it interferes with the beneficial use of the neighbouring property and that it affects the value of that property.  On the other hand, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs are using the aerial mast for a purpose requiring exceptional immunity from electrical interference; that not only are the aerials exceptionally sensitive to such interference, but also the plaintiffs’ business is one of a kind requiring a higher standard of interference-free reception than an ordinary viewer using a domestic aerial would demand.

 

I was invited, and am prepared, to take judicial notice of the fact that the reception of television has become a very common feature of domestic life. The evidence has shown that the quality of reception enjoyed in different parts of the country varies widely, mainly for geographical reasons.  Where the quality of reception is poor the effect of interference is more serious, for the greater the strength of the wanted signal the less the effect on the screen of interference of any given strength.  Where the strength of the wanted signal is low, interference of even quite moderate intensity will degrade the picture. In taking judicial notice of the widespread reception of television in domestic circles, I do so on the footing that in those circles television is enjoyed almost entirely for what I think must be regarded as recreational purposes, notwithstanding that the broadcast programmes include material which may have some educational content, some political content and, it may be, some other content not strictly or exclusively recreational in character.

 

Those programmes, the purposes of which are strictly educational, are not, I presume, intended for domestic consumption or very much looked at in private homes. I mention these matters because, in my judgment, the plaintiffs could not succeed in a claim for damages for nuisance if what I may call an ordinary receiver of television by means of an aerial mounted on his own house could not do so. It is, I think, established by authority that an act which does not, or would not, interfere with the ordinary enjoyment of their property by neighbours in the ordinary modes of using such property cannot constitute a legal nuisance. I quote: ‘A man cannot increase the liabilities of his neighbour by applying his own property to special uses, whether for business or pleasure’ (Eastern and South African Telegraph Co, Ltd v Cape Town Tramways Cos, Ltd ([1902] AC 381 at p393).

 

… Could such interference as is here in question be held to cause an interference with the ordinary enjoyment of life or the ordinary use of the plaintiffs’ property for the purposes of residence or business of such a kind as to amount to an actionable nuisance? There are, of course, many reported cases in which something adversely affecting the beneficial enjoyment of property has been held to constitute a legal nuisance; but I have been referred to no case in which interference with a purely recreational facility has been held to do so. Considerations of health and physical comfort and well being appear to me to be on a somewhat different level from recreational considerations. I do not wish to be taken as laying down that in no circumstances can something which interferes merely with recreational facilities or activities amount to an actionable nuisance.

 

… For myself, however, I do not think that it can at present be said that the ability to receive television free from occasional, even if recurrent and severe, electrical interference is so important a part of an ordinary house-holder’s enjoyment of his property that such interference should be regarded as a legal nuisance, particularly, perhaps, if such interference affects only one of the available alternative programmes.

The use of their aerial for this particular kind of business was, in my judgment, use of a special kind unusually vulnerable to interference, just as the business carried on by the plaintiff in Robinson v Kilvert ((1889), 41 ChD 88) was exceptionally vulnerable to the effects of heat.

 

For these reasons as well as the other reasons given earlier in this judgment I am of opinion that the plaintiffs cannot succeed in this action …

 

Full text

 

BUCKLEY J:

 

The plaintiffs in this action seek an injunction restraining the defendant board from committing a nuisance, which they apprehend that the defendants are about to commit of a kind, and in circumstances, which I shall describe. The plaintiffs carry on a business of providing for residents in Bridlington in the East Riding of Yorkshire a relay system of sound and television broadcasts. The defendants, the Yorkshire Electricity Board, are the area board responsible for the supply of electricity in the area in which Bridlington is situate. The plaintiffs fear that the operation of a power line recently erected by the defendants to the west and north of the town will cause electrical interference adversely affecting the reception of television at the plaintiffs’ aerial and so will damage the plaintiffs’ business.

 

On 1 March 1962, the plaintiffs obtained planning permission from the Borough Council of Bridlington for the erection on a small piece of land owned by the plaintiffs near Pinfold Lane, to the north of the town, of an aerial tower 164 feet high and a small single-storey brick building at its foot. The building and tower in question were erected and brought into use in the middle of December, 1962. Previously the plaintiffs had provided only a radio relay service in Bridlington. Since December, 1962, they have by means of aerials attached to the top of this aerial tower also relayed to their subscribers, or customers, television programmes broadcast by the BBC and the Independent Television Authority.

 

The BBC television transmitter which is nearest to Bridlington is that at Holme Moss; but Bridlington lies some ten miles or more to the north-east of the area in which reception from that transmitter can be regarded as reliably satisfactory. In fact, it lies not far from the outer edge of a belt surrounding that area in which considerable fading of the transmitted pictures is to be expected. The Independent Television Authority transmitter nearest to Bridlington is at Emley Moor; again, Bridlington lies outside and to the east of the area in which reception from this transmitter can be regarded as satisfactory. Indeed, Bridlington is even outside what the ITA regard as the fringe area for Emley Moor transmissions. The standard of reception available to the ordinary domestic viewer using his own aerial in Bridlington is consequently indifferent. This makes Bridlington an attractive field for a relay service. By reason of the height of its aerial mast and the directional character of the aerials employed on it the plaintiffs are able to obtain a much stronger signal than can be obtained on an ordinary domestic aerial erected on the roof of a house. The evidence established that the signal strength of the former is a hundred times the signal strength of the latter. Not only does this obviate, or tend to obviate, the fading experienced by users of ordinary domestic aerials: it also enables the wanted signals received at the plaintiffs’ aerials to compete much more effectively with much electrical interference and so minimise the effects of such interference on the quality of the picture produced by the wanted signals.

 

The plaintiffs advertise their service as giving studio-quality pictures, free from interference, fading or ghosting. Until the occurrence of the matters complained of in this action, the reception at the plaintiffs’ aerials was good in quality and it was exceptional for any electrical interference, which was not due to remedial defects in the plaintiffs’ own system or in the receiving sets of their customers, to deface the pictures relayed by the plaintiffs. These pictures were normally as of good a quality as could have been obtained on receiving sets situate within a few miles from the transmitting stations. The plaintiffs have at present about four hundred and forty-five customers who pay for and take television relayed from their mast at Bridlington. There are some eight hundred other houses in Bridlington wired so as to be capable of receiving this service, the owners of which, however, are not at present subscribers to it. There are also about eight hundred and twenty-five other houses suitably wired internally to receive the service, but not yet connected by land lines to the plaintiffs’ mast because necessary wayleaves have yet to be obtained. The site of the plaintiffs’ mast was selected with regard to its merits as a site for a receiving station and its freedom from neighbouring sources of possible interference. The site would not have been selected had the defendants’ high tension power line, of which complaint is made in this action, been installed where it now stands before the plaintiffs embarked on erecting their mast.

 

The defendants are the electricity board whose statutory duty it is to supply electricity to Bridlington and its neighbourhood. The supply to this particular area is at present provided through a sub-station in Brett Street, Bridlington, equipped with two transformers. The consumption of electricity in the area is such that at times of high demand in the winter both transformers must be in operation at once. This demand is increasing. If one of the transformers were to break down at a time of high demand some part of the load would probably have to be disconnected – that is to say, some people in the area would for the time being be without electricity. Or it might be possible to supplement the depleted supply from Brett Street by transferring some part of the area to a neighbouring source of supply, but the consumers so transferred would receive a much lower voltage than normally. The risk of a transformer breaking down cannot be altogether avoided; nor can the moment be foreseen. Moreover, each transformer has from time to time to be taken out of service for maintenance. Consequently, it is most desirable that the supply of electricity to the Bridlington area should be supplemented. The defendant board decided that the best way to do this would be to establish a second transformer sub-station to the north of the town. In 1961 the defendants set about finding and obtaining a suitable site for a new sub-station and getting the requisite planning permission from the Bridlington corporation. This occupied some time. Eventually planning permission was obtained on 28 February 1963, in respect of a site at Moreton Gate, which lies to the north of the town, subject to a condition, amongst others, that electric cables to and from the sub-station be placed underground for a distance of about five hundred feet in an area of anticipated residential development north of the sub-station. Before that planning permission was obtained the defendants already had under consideration what route the power line to carry electricity to the new sub-station should follow. The intention was, and has remained, to draw the supply from an existing 66 kv line which approaches Bridlington from Driffield to the west and supplies the Brett Street sub-station. The point of departure of the new line from the existing line was to be, and is, about half a mile outside the town to the west. The defendants first submitted to the corporation a proposed route passing nearer to the north of the town than the route finally adopted. The corporation made a counter-proposal of a route about twice as long and going out into the country in a much wider circuit to the north. On 29 January 1963, a conference took place on the spot which was attended by representatives of the defendants, the Bridlington corporation and the county council. A route was then provisionally agreed and pencilled on an ordnance survey map. This route passed very close to the plaintiffs’ mast. It was later surveyed by the defendants and slightly amended with the result that the line finally adopted passes at the nearest point about 169 feet to the north of the mast. At this stage the corporation were anxious not to have the route further to the north on grounds relating to scenic amenity.

 

On 19 June 1963, the defendants notified the General Post Office of their intention to erect an overhead 66 kv line on the route which had been finally agreed with the corporation. On 9 July 1963, the proposal was approved on the Postmaster-General’s behalf, subject to a condition that, so far as the works should be situate within five miles of any part of the post office or coastguard radio station at Flamborough, they should be kept in good order and condition, so that interference with the working of the radio station should be reduced to a minimum. On 2 September 1963, the defendants applied to the Minister of Power for his consent to the erection of the line. This consent was given on 5 November 1963, and the Minister directed pursuant to the Town and County Planning Act, 1962, s 41(1), that permission for the development so approved – that is to say, planning approval, should be deemed to be granted under Part 3 of the Act of 1962. The local authorities concerned and the post office were fully aware of what the defendants were proposing to do; but no notice was given to the plaintiffs, nor had the plaintiffs any knowledge of the project until the defendants’ works came to their notice as I shall now mention. On the other hand, the defendants were throughout aware of the existence of the plaintiffs’ mast and of the nature of its use.

 

The work of erecting the overhead line was put in hand as soon as the Minister’s consent had been obtained. During November, 1963, an employee of the plaintiffs saw foundations being dug for one of the pylons intended to carry the new line at a spot near to the plaintiffs’ aerial mast. This first alerted the plaintiffs. On 20 November 1963, the plaintiffs’ managing director wrote to the defendants complaining that the proximity of the overhead line to the plaintiffs’ aerial would cause interference problems on the plaintiffs’ relay system, and stating that if such interference should occur the plaintiffs would have no alternative to taking every measure to have such interference suppressed. The defendants assured the plaintiffs that every effort would be made to suppress interference. The work proceeded and the erection of the overhead line has been completed. The line passes at the nearest point within approximately one hundred and sixty-nine feet of the aerial mast. The two nearest pylons are each between two hundred and two hundred and fifty feet from the mast, one being approximately to the north-north-east and the other approximately to the west-north-west of the mast. The cost of the line, which is 4,030 yards long, was approximately £20,200. The cost of a longer overhead line of 7,260 yards in length following the route originally proposed by the Bridlington corporation, would have been of the order of £36,000. A line of comparable length to that erected, but laid wholly underground would have probably cost more than £100,000.

 

The plaintiffs’ aerials are directional; that is to say, they are so constructed as to be particularly sensitive to signals reaching them from the particular direction in which they are aimed and much less sensitive to signals reaching them from any other direction. The direction to which such an aerial is directed is known as its ‘line of shoot’. There are two television aerials on the plaintiffs’ mast, one for receiving signals from the BBC transmitter at Holme Moss and one for receiving signals from the Independent Television transmitter at Emley Moor. The lines of shoot of these can, for present purposes, be taken as being identical. They follow a course running approximately south-west from the aerial mast. The defendants’ overhead line, where it passes the plaintiffs’ mast, also runs approximately north-east and south-west following a course roughly parallel to the line of shoot for a little more than half a mile. The overhead line then turns in a more southerly direction and crosses the line of shoot at a point where a pylon stands a little more than three-quarters of a mile from the mast. The line is designed to carry a three-phase fifty cycle alternating supply of 66 kv. It is supported on lattice steel towers or pylons, and the conductors are supported on insulator strings having five insulators on each string.

 

The defendants believe that the line will cause no interference harmful to the plaintiffs’ business, but have been unable to satisfy the plaintiffs of this. Consequently, the writ in this action was issued on 4 May 1964 claiming an injunction restraining the defendants from so operating their power line as to interfere with the reception of radio and television transmissions at the plaintiffs’ aerial mast. I may say in passing that at the trial no point was taken or evidence called relating to radio transmissions. It is possible interference with television reception that the plaintiffs fear. On the hearing of a motion for interlocutory relief the defendants undertook until judgment or further order, not to energise the power line except for the purpose of carrying out tests in the presence of representatives of the plaintiffs, and at agreed times. That undertaking is still in operation. The power line has never been energised except during the tests to which I shall refer.

 

I have heard evidence which, in my judgment, establishes that high-power overhead lines are a frequent source of electrical interference; but that, on the other hand, many overhead power lines pass close to a lot of television aerials without causing much or any trouble. It does not seem to me to be possible to generalise about what effect a power line will have in this respect. Experts regard such lines as a frequent, but not inevitable, source of interference. Accordingly, it will be for me to consider with some care what occurred during the only period when this line has been alive.

 

[His Lordship referred to the kinds of interference with which he had been concerned, saying that they were two: first, ‘ghosting’ caused by a reflection of the wanted signal which results in a duplication of the picture providing two or more images on the screen which do not coincide; and, secondly, unwanted signals received as the result of various kinds of electrical discharge. The erection of the defendants’ overhead line had resulted in the appearance of some ghosting in the pictures received through the plaintiffs’ aerials. This appeared to be due to the presence of the pylons. It had nothing to do with energising the line and such interference would be unnoticeable to an ordinary viewer. His Lordship then explained the relevant kinds of interference from electrical discharges, and a technique adopted in this power line to minimise risk of interference. He reviewed the evidence concerning a test period from 27 May 1964 to 2 June 1964, when the overhead power line was energised. Referring to the events on 1 June he stated that in the evening light rain began to fall, and some interference developed on the plaintiffs’ television set; it developed at 7.23 pm into severe interference, but as the rain continued it decreased, becoming less severe at 7.45 pm and ceasing at 9 pm when the rain had become heavy. His Lordship continued:]

 

On the evidence available to me I reach the following conclusions of fact: that the interference experienced on the evening of 1 June originated from a source or sources on the defendants’ power line; that it was not due to any general condition at that time affecting the line as a whole, for the tests then made at Pinfold Lane negative this; that it was due to conditions then existing at one or more particular points on the line, probably on or not very far off the line of shoot of the plaintiffs’ aerials; that the disturbance or aggregate of disturbances at this point or those points was of a high degree of intensity, a degree higher than would be expected normally to result from leakage of current across the surface of new and clean insulators in climatic conditions such as then existed. There was evidence indicating that, as I should otherwise be almost ready to assume, new overhead power lines, like other infant equipments and installations, frequently suffer from teething troubles. It seems to me that the balance of probability favours the view that interference of such a character and intensity as was experienced through the plaintiffs’ aerials on the evening of 1 June was due to some such teething troubles connected with the defendants’ power line which may well be remediable. It may, for instance, be – although this is speculation – that the greasing process adopted by the defendants, which was unusual and in the nature of an experiment, was not altogether satisfactorily carried out, and that this has occasioned unusual conditions producing unlooked-for results. It may be – again a speculation – that in the course of erection some unobserved foreign body or bodies became caught up with and built into the line. According to Mr Dembinski this is not an unusual occurrence, and such foreign bodies usually become burnt out in a month or so, during which process they may well cause electrical interference. On the balance of probability I find as a fact that the plaintiffs’ experiences on the evening of 1 June were due to remediable defects in the defendants’ power line.

 

By reason of their undertaking to this court, the defendants have had no opportunity, since the tests took place, of re-energising the line. Until the line is re-energised it is really impracticable for the defendants to search for and identify any such defects as may exist in the line, and so it is impracticable for the defendants to remedy them. The defendants have, however, offered the plaintiffs an assurance, already mentioned, that they will make every effort to suppress interference resulting from their line. I see no reason to think that they will not do their best to honour this assurance. Their greasing of the line seems to indicate that they will.

 

The plaintiffs have not yet suffered any damage as the result of the nuisance which they apprehend that the energised power line will cause. Consequently, the plaintiffs have not at present a complete cause of action in nuisance. This action is a quia timet proceeding. In my judgment, having regard to my findings of fact, it would be wrong for this court in quia timet proceedings to grant relief by way of injunction to compel the defendants to do something which they appear to be willing to do without the imposition of an order of the court. An alternative to refusing an injunction would no doubt be to adopt the course sometimes taken, where a nuisance already exists which must take time to abate, of granting an injunction and suspending its operation for a sufficient period. I think that that course would not be a proper one in a case such as this, where the defendants have not, on the facts found, yet been shown to be in the wrong.

 

This is sufficient to dispose of the case, but lest I should be held to be wrong in anything I have so far said, I should, I think, proceed to state my view on another aspect of the matter which has been fully canvassed before me: that is, whether, if the tendency of the power line to cause interference at the plaintiffs’ aerials is ineradicable, or if, contrary to the view which I have expressed, the fact that it may be remediable is irrelevant, the plaintiffs could successfully maintain a claim in nuisance.

 

If interference of the kind experienced by the plaintiffs on 1 June were to recur at all frequently, it is very probable that the plaintiffs’ business would be damaged. If such damage were established, and it were shown that it would be likely to continue or recur, would the plaintiffs have a cause of action in nuisance? For the plaintiffs it is contended that to receive television is now an ordinary use of land and that causing radiation which results in preventing, or interfering with, the satisfactory reception of television transmissions is something which unwarrantably interferes with the legitimate and reasonable enjoyment of neighbouring property by its owners. It is said that, if that interference is of a sufficiently grave character, it may amount to an actionable nuisance on either or both of two grounds: viz, that it interferes with the beneficial use of the neighbouring property and that it affects the value of that property. On the other hand, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs are using the aerial mast for a purpose requiring exceptional immunity from electrical interference; that not only are the aerials exceptionally sensitive to such interference, but also the plaintiffs’ business is one of a kind requiring a higher standard of interference-free reception than an ordinary viewer using a domestic aerial would demand.

 

I was invited, and am prepared, to take judicial notice of the fact that the reception of television has become a very common feature of domestic life. The evidence has shown that the quality of reception enjoyed in different parts of the country varies widely, mainly for geographical reasons. Where the quality of reception is poor the effect of interference is more serious, for the greater the strength of the wanted signal the less the effect on the screen of interference of any given strength. Where the strength of the wanted signal is low, interference of even quite moderate intensity will degrade the picture. In taking judicial notice of the widespread reception of television in domestic circles, I do so on the footing that in those circles television is enjoyed almost entirely for what I think must be regarded as recreational purposes, notwithstanding that the broadcast programmes include material which may have some educational content, some political content and, it may be, some other content not strictly or exclusively recreational in character. Those programmes, the purposes of which are strictly educational, are not, I presume, intended for domestic consumption or very much looked at in private homes. I mention these matters because, in my judgment, the plaintiffs could not succeed in a claim for damages for nuisance if what I may call an ordinary receiver of television by means of an aerial mounted on his own house could not do so. It is, I think, established by authority that an act which does not, or would not, interfere with the ordinary enjoyment of their property by neighbours in the ordinary modes of using such property cannot constitute a legal nuisance. I quote:

 

‘A man cannot increase the liabilities of his neighbour by applying his own property to special uses, whether for business or pleasure’

 

(Eastern and South African Telegraph Co Ltd v Cape Town Tramways Cos Ltd ([1902] AC 381 at p 393)). In Robinson v Kilvert, Cotton LJ stated the principle thus ((1889), 41 Ch D 88 at p 94):

‘If a person does what in itself is noxious, or which interferes with the ordinary use and enjoyment of a neighbour’s property, it is a nuisance. But no case has been cited where the doing something not in itself noxious has been held a nuisance, unless it interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of life, or the ordinary use of property for the purposes of residence or business.’

 

The dissemination of electrical interference is not, in my judgment, ‘noxious’ in the sense in which, I think, the learned lord justice is there using the term. Could such interference as is here in question be held to cause an interference with the ordinary enjoyment of life or the ordinary use of the plaintiffs’ property for the purposes of residence or business of such a kind as to amount to an actionable nuisance?

 

There are, of course, many reported cases in which something adversely affecting the beneficial enjoyment of property has been held to constitute a legal nuisance; but I have been referred to no case in which interference with a purely recreational facility has been held to do so. Considerations of health and physical comfort and well being appear to me to be on a somewhat different level from recreational considerations. I do not wish to be taken as laying down that in no circumstances can something which interferes merely with recreational facilities or activities amount to an actionable nuisance. It may be that in some other case the court may be satisfied that some such interference should be regarded, according to such ‘plain and sober and simple notions’ as Sir J L Knight Bruce V-C, referred to in a well-known passage in his judgment in Walter v Selfe ((1851), 4 De G & Sm 315 at p 322), as detracting from the beneficial use and enjoyment by neighbouring owners of their properties to such an extent as to warrant their protection by the law. For myself, however, I do not think that it can at present be said that the ability to receive television free from occasional, even if recurrent and severe, electrical interference is so important a part of an ordinary house-holder’s enjoyment of his property that such interference should be regarded as a legal nuisance, particularly, perhaps, if such interference affects only one of the available alternative programmes.

 

Accordingly, I do not think that even if the conditions which existed on the evening of 1 June would have produced the same effect on the screen of a house-holder using an aerial mounted on his own house at the site of the plaintiffs’ mast, this would have constituted an actionable nuisance. In fact, no evidence was adduced that anyone in Bridlington on that evening receiving television by means of an ordinary domestic aerial, experienced any such interference as was experienced by the plaintiffs, unless it be the evidence of Mr Myles [Mr Myles lived in Bridlington and, at about 7.30 pm on 1 June had experienced exceptional interference on the screen of his television set. The phenomenon took the form of horizontal lines running across the screen and moving up and down it]. The phenomenon which he observed on his screen was, however, different from the four static bands observed on the plaintiffs’ screen, and, as I have found, probably had no relation to the defendants’ power line. The evidence did not establish that the signal received by the user of an ordinary domestic aerial mounted in the ordinary way on his house would have been the same or similar to the signal received by the plaintiffs by means of their large directional aerial mounted at the head of their aerial mast; but even if this be assumed in the plaintiffs’ favour, I am of opinion for the reasons which I have already stated, that such a user of an ordinary domestic aerial for domestic enjoyment could not succeed on a claim for nuisance.

 

The plaintiffs’ complaint is concerned not with interference with domestic amenities; their complaint is that their business will be damaged. But their business is such that to prosper it requires an exceptional degree of immunity from interference. To prosper it must be able to offer its subscribers a better service than they could obtain through aerials of their own. It was not established to my satisfaction that the aerial used by the plaintiffs for receiving BBC transmissions from Holme Moss was proportionately more sensitive to interference than domestic aerials are in the same area, but it was established that the business of the plaintiffs was exceptionally sensitive in the sense which I have just indicated. The use of their aerial for this particular kind of business was, in my judgment, use of a special kind unusually vulnerable to interference, just as the business carried on by the plaintiff in Robinson v Kilvert was exceptionally vulnerable to the effects of heat.

 

For these reasons as well as the other reasons given earlier in this judgment I am of opinion that the plaintiffs cannot succeed in this action.

 

It is not, I think, necessary for me to refer in any detail to the reported cases to which my attention was drawn except, perhaps, to mention that they included two interesting decisions of courts in the United States of America. In Amphitheatres Inc v Portland Meadows, the plaintiffs, who were proprietors of an out-of-door cinema, claimed relief against the defendants’ use of floodlighting on neighbouring land so as to damage the plaintiffs’ business. The plaintiffs’ claim in nuisance was held by the Supreme Court of Oregon to fail on account of the sensitive character of their own business. The ratio decidendi in that case was the same as that in Robinson v Kilvet and that which I have adopted. In Phillippay v Pacific Power and Light Co, in the Supreme Court of Washington, on appeal from the Superior Court of Walla Walla County, the plaintiff was the proprietor of a telegraph line, the functioning of which was adversely affected by electric current which found its way into that line by induction from a neighbouring overhead power line belonging to the defendant company. This trouble was capable of being cured by the plaintiff’s telegraph line, which was constructed as a single wire system with no return line to complete the circuit, the current employed being ‘metallicised’, that is to say, provided with such a return line. The court cited and followed, amongst other cases, Eastern and South African Telegraph Co Ltd v Cape Town Tramways Cos, Ltd and dismissed the action.

 

Having regard to the conclusions which I have reached, it is not, I think, necessary for me to say anything about that part of the argument which related to the defendants’ statutory powers and duties relating to the supply of electricity. I may, however, perhaps add this. The fact that the plaintiffs and others in like circumstances may be without a remedy under the law of nuisance does not leave them without any possible remedy. Part 2 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1949, confers on the Postmaster-General a power to make regulations relating to possible sources of interference with wireless telegraphy. No such regulations have been made in respect of power lines; but, if overhead power lines are in fact such a likely source of interference as the plaintiffs have in this case suggested, it seems not impossible that the Postmaster-General, if asked to do so, might make regulations relating to such lines under the powers conferred on him by this statute. I do not mention this as having any bearing on the plaintiffs’ common law rights, but merely to indicate that Parliament has provided other possible means of obtaining protection for those who fear the kind of damage that the plaintiffs in this case fear.

For those reasons, in my judgment the plaintiffs fail in the action.

 

 

BREWER v DELO [1967] 1 LLOYD’S REP 488

QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION

 

BREWER v DELO [1967] 1 LLOYD’S REP 488

 

Editor’s comments in red.

 

Editor’s evaluation

 

FACTS a golfer had hooked his tee shot so that his ball struck another player playing an adjacent hole on the sixth fairway some 200 yards ahead.

 

HINCHCLIFFE J:

On the whole of the evidence I do not think that the defendant was in breach of his duty to take care. He did nothing which was not normal practice at his club. It seems to me that the duty of the golfer must be based on a reasonable foreseeability of damage. In the circumstances here the test is: Would any reasonable person foresee that the act of driving off would cause damage? I think not. Even if damage was foreseeable, the possibility of injury happening to a person on the sixth fairway involves a risk so small that a reasonable man would feel justified in disregarding it. I take the view here that no danger was foreseeable, and therefore there was no need to take precautions. Obviously as the danger increases so must the precautions increase. In my judgment this was a pure accident, and it would not be right to hold that the defendant was in any way to blame or that he in any way failed in his duty to take care.

… [I]n the circumstances, a reasonable person would not foresee that the act of driving off would cause damage that, even if damage was foreseeable, the possibility of injury to person on sixth fairway involved risk so small that reasonable man would be justified in disregarding it; that, therefore, defendant was not in breach of his duty to take care and plaintiffs claim fails.

 

Editor’s evaluation

 

** ORANGE. Cases in orange are nice to know but not vital. They may be worth Brownie points, for example because they are recent cases or illustrate minor legal principles.

 

NOTE a case marked *** is more important than one marked **.

 

This case was cited in an article, The sliding snail [2007] NLJ 168, by way of comparison with PEARSON v LIGHTNING [1998] 20 LS Gaz R 33 – CA. The gist of article is that the tort of negligence has developed from being ‘based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay’ (Lord Atkin in DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] All ER 1) to that of taking an unnecessary, or even a slight, risk.

BRETT v UNIVERSITY OF READING [2007] EWCA Civ 88

COURT OF APPEAL

 

BRETT v UNIVERSITY OF READING [2007] EWCA Civ 88

 

NICHOLAS PAUL BRETT (PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF BERNARD BRETT, DECEASED) v UNIVERSITY OF READING

 

14 February 2007

 

Full text

 

Editor’s comments in red

 

Editor’s evaluation

 

LORD JUSTICE SEDLEY:

 

1. Because of the widespread use of asbestos-based materials in the construction and equipment of buildings, workers employed many years ago in the building trade are still developing either asbestosis, which is a disabling but not necessarily fatal lung fibrosis, or mesothelioma, a cruel and invariably fatal cancer of which the only known cause is the inhalation of asbestos fibres … The House of Lords in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22 [in the Library] decided that an employer was liable if it had materially and tortiously contributed to the risk of producing the mesothelioma, without need to prove direct causation of the condition. Any unlawful exposure of the employee to airborne asbestos will ordinarily constitute such a contribution if mesothelioma develops.

 

2. In Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20 [in the Library] the House held liability for such wrongdoing to be several and not joint, with the result that recovery had to be proportioned to each defendant’s contribution to the totality of the employee’s exposure. This doctrine was reversed by s.3 of the Compensation Act 2006, which provides … that in mesothelioma cases each contributory wrongdoer is liable for the whole of the damage, but without prejudice to its right to recover contribution from other tortfeasors.

 

3. Mr Brett died of mesothelioma at the age of 75 in October 2001. There was no evidence … to suggest that Mr Brett contracted this industrial disease other than through one of his employments. One of his employments had been with … Reading University … But in the course of a long working life … Mr Brett had worked for numerous employers … Although there was a real possibility that he had been exposed in many of these jobs to airborne asbestos …, no other employer was sued in addition to [Reading University] …, apparently for lack of evidence.

 

4. Reading University employed Mr Brett as a clerk of works from 1983 to 1988. For at least part of this time he was supervising the dismantling of the old library at the university … The engineering expert called on the claimants’ behalf, Mr Clark, gave evidence that the original library building … probably contained a number of asbestos-based materials in its structure; and the [trial] judge noted that, at least in two of the rooms dismantled in the 1980s when Mr Brett was clerk of works, asbestos was found.

 

5. Judge Elly [the trial judge] directed himself accurately as to the effect of Fairchild:

 

‘If the deceased … had been exposed negligently … to asbestos by the defendants, then [the claimant] does not have to prove that it was the particular exposure in that employment which caused the mesothelioma.’

13. The evidence was at lowest sufficient to show that demolition work was being undertaken in the old library which was going to liberate asbestos dust, and that Mr Brett had from time to time to inspect the work as it proceeded. It was not a defence in itself that the work was done by reputable contractors and subcontractors under professional supervision. There was evidence that the contractors had been given instructions to take all necessary precautions, but no direct evidence that the necessary precautions were in fact taken to seal off the spaces in which asbestos dust might be liberated and to ensure that nobody, including Mr Brett, entered them without respiratory protection. Nor, however, was there any direct evidence that precautions had not been taken.

16. The critical question … is whether the exposure to which it is likely that Mr Brett was subjected was such as to put the university in breach … In other words, did the university fail to take the necessary precautions to ensure that he did not inhale asbestos fibres?

 

17. … [I]t is for the claimant to establish the elements of his case, and one such element in a personal injury action is that the injury was caused by a breach of duty on the defendant’s part.

21. The contractors had gone out of business, and neither party had traced (or at least brought to court) any of their former personnel … [N]o inference about lack of protection could be drawn from the bare fact that Mr Brett had developed mesothelioma …

24. It follows that, while the evidence was sufficient to enable the court to infer that Mr Brett came into contact with asbestos in the course of his work at Reading University, it was not sufficient to show, or to support an inference, that the university had failed to take necessary steps to protect him from inhaling it. The tragic fact that he eventually developed mesothelioma cannot fill the gap, because for most of his working life he had been in jobs which were equally capable of bringing him into contact with airborne asbestos. If there had been adequate evidence of breach of duty on the part of the university, Mr Brett’s estate and dependants would have recovered … damages in full notwithstanding the possible responsibility of other employers. But without such evidence the action against the university had to fail.

 

25. … I would dismiss this appeal.

 

LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY:

 

26. I agree. In a case such as this, Fairchild exceptionally relieves a claimant who has proved exposure and breach of duty from having to prove causation. What it does not do is to relieve him from proving the other elements. As Lord Justice Sedley has demonstrated, the evidence in this case sufficiently established exposure in the course of employment at Reading University but it did not begin to establish a breach of duty on the part of the university. Accordingly, I too would dismiss the appeal.

Full text

 

LORD JUSTICE SEDLEY:

 

1. Because of the widespread use of asbestos-based materials in the construction and equipment of buildings, workers employed many years ago in the building trade are still developing either asbestosis, which is a disabling but not necessarily fatal lung fibrosis, or mesothelioma, a cruel and invariably fatal cancer of which the only known cause is the inhalation of asbestos fibres. The latency period of the disease is in many cases extremely long. Medical opinion is now divided as to whether the carcinogenicity of asbestos lies, as it was always believed to do, in the intensity and duration of exposure or in the effect of a single fibre among the millions inhaled. Whichever it is, the House of Lords in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22; [2003] 1 AC 32 [in the Library] decided that an employer was liable if it had materially and tortiously contributed to the risk of producing the mesothelioma, without need to prove direct causation of the condition. Any unlawful exposure of the employee to airborne asbestos will ordinarily constitute such a contribution if mesothelioma develops.

 

2. In Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20 [in the Library] the House held liability for such wrongdoing to be several and not joint, with the result that recovery had to be proportioned to each defendant’s contribution to the totality of the employee’s exposure. This doctrine was reversed by s.3 of the Compensation Act 2006, which provides, in substance, that in mesothelioma cases each contributory wrongdoer is liable for the whole of the damage, but without prejudice to its right to recover contribution from other tortfeasors.

 

3. Mr Brett died of mesothelioma at the age of 75 in October 2001. There was no evidence, the trial judge at Reading County Court, Judge Elly, noted, ‘to suggest that Mr Brett contracted this industrial disease other than through one of his employments’. One of his employments had been with the present respondent, the University of Reading, which was the only defendant to the Fatal Accidents and Law Reform claims. But in the course of a long working life between 1940 and 1999, all of it in engineering and construction work, Mr Brett had worked for numerous employers as an electrician, chargehand, site supervisor and clerk of works supervising electrical and mechanical engineering work. Although there was a real possibility that he had been exposed in many of these jobs to airborne asbestos (his first employment, during World War II, had been in power stations), and although the joint medical opinion in the case laid equal blame on all such exposures, no other employer was sued in addition to the present respondent. Proceedings had been intimated against the London Electricity Board, for which Mr Brett had worked on power stations from 1953 to 1967, and against the University of Surrey, for which he had worked from 1973 to 1982, but had not been pursued, apparently for lack of evidence.

 

4. Reading University employed Mr Brett as a clerk of works from 1983 to 1988. For at least part of this time he was supervising the dismantling of the old library at the university, which took about two years. After his condition had been diagnosed Mr Brett told his wife ‘that he had come into contact with asbestos when he was supervising the tearing down of the old library at Reading University and adding the new library extension to it’. The engineering expert called on the claimants’ behalf, Mr Clark, gave evidence that the original library building, which was designed in the 1950s and built in the 1960s with a specification that included ‘flame-resistant fibreboard throughout’, probably contained a number of asbestos-based materials in its structure; and the judge noted that, at least in two of the rooms dismantled in the 1980s when Mr Brett was clerk of works, asbestos was found.

 

5. Judge Elly directed himself accurately as to the effect of Fairchild:

 

‘If the deceased … had been exposed negligently or in breach of statutory duty to asbestos by the defendants, then [the claimant] does not have to prove that it was the particular exposure in that employment which caused the mesothelioma.’

 

He went on, after reviewing the evidence, to hold:

 

‘… if the evidence is that the defendants exposed Mr Brett to asbestos in breach of statutory duty or negligently, then it is for the defendants to establish that there is no material contribution to the disease …’

 

6. The judge went on to consider the twin defences (a) that there was no or insufficient evidence that Mr Brett was ever exposed to loose asbestos while working at Reading University, and (b) that if there was any such exposure it was not due to negligence or breach of statutory duty on the university’s part.

 

7. The judge found it proved that at Reading University Mr Brett had indeed worked ‘in an environment where there was asbestos’. But it was not proved, and he was not satisfied that he could infer, that asbestos fibres were becoming airborne in that environment and so were likely to have been inhaled by Mr Brett. The difficulty with such an inference, he found, was ‘the possibility that he was exposed to asbestos fibres at one or other of his other employments’, a possibility clearly flagged up by the claimant’s own expert evidence.

 

8. The judge concluded that:

 

‘…whilst [Mr Brett] was exposed to asbestos sheeting in the plant room at Reading University, he might equally have been exposed to it elsewhere, and without any evidence that there was some damage to the sheeting then it seems to me that it is impossible to infer that he must have acquired his asbestosis from that exposure as opposed to one of the other possible exposures during the course of his earlier employment.’

 

The reason for this was that he had ‘no evidence which suggests that either the main contractor or the subcontractors or the University in any way failed to carry out the work properly.

 

9. Accordingly Judge Elly held:

 

‘… I cannot infer on the balance of probabilities that because the claimant has only proved a connection with asbestos material at Reading that that is the place where he contracted asbestosis … In the absence of any evidence which showed failure on the part of the defendants or default in their duties, it seems to me that the inference that Mr Brett must have acquired his asbestosis at Reading University just does not follow.’

 

10. It can be seen that, notwithstanding his correct initial self-direction on the Fairchild principle, the judge expressed his conclusions in quite different terms. He appeared to be looking for proof that Reading University was ‘the place where [Mr Brett] contracted’ his terminal condition. In passing, I should say that the repeated reference to asbestosis instead of mesothelioma is unfortunate because different principles of law apply to the causation of the two conditions. But the real problem which emerges from the passages I have cited is that the judge appears in them to be comparing one potential source of exposure with another and forgetting that it does not matter to one defendant’s liability for contributing to the material risk that another party, whether a defendant or not, may also have contributed to it.

 

11. In cases like the present one, where a diagnosis of mesothelioma ineluctably implicates asbestos dust, the first question in relation to any party alleged to be liable for contributing to the risk which has now eventuated is whether that party in fact made any such contribution. If it did, it remains to be decided whether the party was legally at fault. The two questions sometimes overlap: for example, evidence that full precautions were taken may answer both questions in the defendant’s favour – but that did not happen here. Where there is only one employment in which asbestos exposure can have occurred, the inference that that is where it did occur will be practically irresistible. Where there are two or more such employments, the inference that exposure occurred in at least one of them will be equally irresistible, but it becomes a possibility that in one or more of them no such exposure occurred. It is a possibility which can frequently be discounted, usually because there is clear evidence that in that employment asbestos dust was regularly liberated and no respiratory protection was provided – but that too did not happen here. It therefore remained a matter to be judged on what evidence there was.

 

12. Is that what the judge was in reality doing here? If it was, I do not think he went about it satisfactorily. Conflating the separate issues of contribution and fault, he summarised his findings of fact in this way:

 

‘There is some evidence that Mr Brett went into a room which had asbestos in it on one or two occasions, either to show a specialist the room for the purpose of them preparing their quotation, or one other occasion to see what was happening, but not, as far as I can tell, during the course of any work being carried out – there is no suggestion that he was in there at that stage. What the Claimant asked me to do is to infer that as Clerk of the Works he was likely to be involved at the time of the work being carried out, but against that I have the evidence of Mr Westacott, who was employed by the University from 1984 and his position with the University was as a qualified architect, but he was employed ultimately as Head of Estates Services – that of course was after the date that Mr Brett started working there and after the dates which are most relevant in terms of his possible exposure to asbestos. But he says that on the basis of the instructions which were in force when he went there, he would not have expected Mr Brett to be involved at all in this side of the work. Having said that, he also said that he would not have expected Mr Brett to be asked to show contractors on the site, although in fact on the evidence that is before me I find that on one occasion at least he did do so.’

 

13. The evidence was at lowest sufficient to show that demolition work was being undertaken in the old library which was going to liberate asbestos dust, and that Mr Brett had from time to time to inspect the work as it proceeded. It was not a defence in itself that the work was done by reputable contractors and subcontractors under professional supervision. There was evidence that the contractors had been given instructions to take all necessary precautions, but no direct evidence that the necessary precautions were in fact taken to seal off the spaces in which asbestos dust might be liberated and to ensure that nobody, including Mr Brett, entered them without respiratory protection. Nor, however, was there any direct evidence that precautions had not been taken.

 

14. A good deal of argument before us was devoted to how the case had been put below. Although Mr Matovu had sought, as he has also done before us, to argue from the development of mesothelioma to unlawful exposure by Reading University, for reasons I have explained this is a syllogism which does not work where there have been multiple employments that may have involved such exposure. It may explain why the judge reasoned part of his decision in the way he did, but it remained his task to apply correctly the law of which he had reminded himself. What would have been the outcome had he done so?

 

15. The evidence of the claimant’s expert, Mr Clark, was that Mr Brett ‘probably would have encountered and/or disturbed asbestos-based materials himself and/or he would have been present while other tradesmen disturbed, disrupted and/or used asbestos-based materials’. Although he agreed with Ms Adams in cross-examination that there was no evidence of exposure through damage to or deterioration of such materials, the evidence I have mentioned was unshaken and, given the records produced by the university, clearly right.

 

16. The critical question which remained, and which still remains, is whether the exposure to which it is likely that Mr Brett was subjected was such as to put the university in breach of its common law or statutory duties to him. In other words, did the university fail to take the necessary precautions to ensure that he did not inhale asbestos fibres?

 

17. I put the question in this way, rather than asking whether the university took the necessary precautions, because on principle it is for the claimant to establish the elements of his case, and one such element in a personal injury action is that the injury was caused by a breach of duty on the defendant’s part.

 

18. Mr Matovu submits that this is not the right approach. He relies on Lord Mansfield’s dictum in Blatch v Archer (1774 I Cowp. 63, 65, cited by Lord Bingham in Fairchild, §13:

 

‘It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted.’

 

19. I accept that special rules may apply, in accordance with this approach, in special cases, but I am unable to accept, in the absence of authority, that either generally in personal injury litigation or specifically in a case such as the present it falls to the defendant to prove that proper precautions were taken. The allegation that they were not was a necessary part of the claimant’s pleaded case, and – at least in the absence of factors more special than we have here – it was for the claimant to establish it, whether from his own or the defendants’ evidence or documents.

 

20. Ms Adams submits that there was no evidence even to show that the quantity of airborne asbestos exceeded the statutory threshold of 2 fibres per millilitre of air; but this is fanciful. Stripping out constructional asbestos produces clouds of asbestos dust: hence the strict precautions required by the Asbestos Regulations 1969 in terms of respiratory equipment, protective clothing and cleanliness. Ms Adams’ real case is that Mr Matovu has no direct evidence and no evidence from which it can be inferred that proper precautions were not taken.

 

21. The contractors had gone out of business, and neither party had traced (or at least brought to court) any of their former personnel. For reasons I have given, no inference about lack of protection could be drawn from the bare fact that Mr Brett had developed mesothelioma. Mr Matovu submits, however, that he is able to establish it, as it were, by default. He points to the batch of contemporaneous documents produced by the university, showing a clear awareness of the need for the contractors to comply with the Asbestos Regulations, and to the absence of any corresponding documents indicating compliance. From this, he submits, it is legitimate to draw the affirmative inference, in the absence of more concrete evidence, that protective measures were overlooked in the course of the demolition work.

 

22. I accept that where, as here, the rest of the evidence points neither way, a straw in the wind may be decisive. But if the absence of certain documents is to have this effect, they must be documents which one would have expected to be present. Those documents mentioning asbestos which the university has retained and produced are copies of letters from and to engineers, architects, specialist consultants, contractors (including asbestos specialists) and the university’s buildings officer. They include estimates from contractors specialising in asbestos removal, setting out the . precautionary measures to be taken (working area to be sealed off and restricted to operatives with HSE-approved protective clothing and respirators; clean-up with approved vacuum equipment), and minutes of site meetings noting the progress of asbestos removal.

 

23. In this situation the absence of any memoranda or other documents in the university’s files confirming compliance with the Asbestos Regulations is in my judgment as consistent with compliance as with non-compliance by the contractors. Ms Adams argues that it is, if anything, more likely that building operations which can be seen to have been carried out for an institutional employer by a hierarchy of skilled professionals were carried out, as the estimates undertook they would be, in compliance with the law, than that compliance was overlooked or ignored. But this reasoning (which is not the same as allowing the university to answer the claim by simply saying that it took on reputable contractors) is not necessary to the decision of the case, and I prefer to express no view on it. What matters is that there are, in my judgment, no such eloquent or suspicious gaps in the university’s documentation as Mr Matovu suggests: the undoubted absence of documents of the kind he proposes is as consistent with the exercise of the requisite care in the course of the demolition work as with neglect of it.

 

24. It follows that, while the evidence was sufficient to enable the court to infer that Mr Brett came into contact with asbestos in the course of his work at Reading University, it was not sufficient to show, or to support an inference, that the university had failed to take necessary steps to protect him from inhaling it. The tragic fact that he eventually developed mesothelioma cannot fill the gap, because for most of his working life he had been in jobs which were equally capable of bringing him into contact with airborne asbestos. If there had been adequate evidence of breach of duty on the part of the university, Mr Brett’s estate and dependants would have recovered the agreed damages in full notwithstanding the possible responsibility of other employers. But without such evidence the action against the university had to fail.

 

25. For these reasons, which are not the same as those relied on by the judge, I would dismiss this appeal.

 

LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY:

 

26. I agree. In a case such as this, Fairchild exceptionally relieves a claimant who has proved exposure and breach of duty from having to prove causation. What it does not do is to relieve him from proving the other elements. As Lord Justice Sedley has demonstrated, the evidence in this case sufficiently established exposure in the course of employment at Reading University but it did not begin to establish a breach of duty on the part of the university. Accordingly, I too would dismiss the appeal.

 

LORD JUSTICE LAWS:

 

27. I agree with both judgments.

 

Editor’s evaluation

 

*** ORANGE. Cases in orange are nice to know but not vital. They may be worth Brownie points, for example because they are recent cases or illustrate minor legal principles.

 

This case is a good illustration of the following point. Although Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22 exceptionally relieves a claimant who has proved exposure to asbestos from having to prove causation, it does relieve him from proving the other elements of negligence. Here, the claimant could not establish breach of duty.

 

NOTE a case marked *** is more important than one marked **.

 

BREEDEN v LAMPARD [1985] LTL AC1744281

COURT OF APPEAL

 

BREEDEN v LAMPARD [1985] LTL AC1744281

 

OVERRULED – see Mirvahedy v Henley [2002] UKHL 16 [in the Library]  

 

21 March 1985

 

OLIVER LJ:

 

I have asked Sir George Waller to deliver the first judgment on this appeal.

 

SIR GEORGE WALLER:

 

This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Macpherson, given on 28th October 1983. On that day he dismissed a claim for damages arising out of a riding accident at a cubbing meet of the Atherstone Hunt on 8th October 1978, when Mrs. Breedon, whom I shall call the appellant, suffered a bad fracture of her right leg.

 

The appellant and Mrs. Lampard, whom I shall call the respondent, were both experienced horsewomen and were part of the hunting field. The respondent had been out for some time, but the appellant had just joined the field. The hounds had just drawn a kale field and had begun to hunt. The respondent had come out onto the road behind the others, when the movement of the hunt reversed and a number of the members of the hunt passed the respondent in the road. The respondent and some others, including the appellant, followed and when the appellant was close behind the respondent the respondent’s horse, Raffles, shuffled to the left and then kicked out, causing the appellant to suffer the broker leg.

 

The appellant’s claim was twofold: Firstly, that the respondent was in breach of the Animals Act 1971; secondly, that the accident was caused by the negligence of the respondent.

 

The respondent’s horse was a young horse; the respondent said that she had put a red ribbon – in fact it was a square of red velvet – on the horse’s tail so that people would keep away from this young horse. Although she did this, she had never known the horse to kick. The judge found that the respondent’s horse was unsettled and, with others, had probably been checked immediately before the accident. He found that the appellant did close up to the respondent to a position very close to the back of the respondent’s horse, perhaps touching it but at least close enough for Raffles to be aware that it was too close for his liking.

 

Although the appellant did not see the red patch, the judge accepted that it was there. He found that Raffles was a young and naturally exuberant horse, but was not a kicker. He accepted that on no occasion before had the horse kicked out; he held that any horse may kick, and a young one is more likely to do so than an older horse, but there was no evidence to suggest that Raffles was anything more than a natural and normal five-year-old. The judge came to the conclusion that there was no breach of s.2 of the Animals Act 1971, and held that the respondent had not been shown to be negligent in any way.

 

He said:

 

‘In my judgment, she has not been shown to have been in breach of such duty or to have been negligent in any way. I accept that she put the red ribbon on the horse because it was young and inexperienced, and probably for the double reason that this fact should be advertised and in order to try to get people to keep away from her horse for the horse’s own sake. It does help, she said, to keep followers away from the rear, and in cross-examination she said: ‘It is to warn people and to keep people off my heels’. It would be quite wrong on the evidence to say baldly that red means unusual or unacceptable danger, and that the result of giving this signal meant that Mrs. Lampard had more or less to back her horse away and let no-one follow or get near her at all. Certainly she should, as in my judgment she did, keep when possible to the back of the field in general terms, and where it was practicable to do so let others pass by and be alert to warn others, if necessary, that the horse was young and new to the hunting field’.

 

Mr. Nicholl’s main submission before us was that the judge was wrong in finding that there was no breach of s.2(2) of the Animals Act. To put it in context, I should say that subsection (1) deals with dangerous species, and subsection (2) reads as:

 

‘Where damage is caused by an animal which does not belong to a dangerous species, a keeper of the animal is liable for the damage, except as otherwise provided by this Act, if -

(a) the damage is of a kind which the animal, unless restrained, was likely to cause or which, if caused by the animal, was likely to be severe; and

(b) the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the

same species or are not normally so found except at particular times or in particular circumstances’ -

 

I do not think I need read (c), as it is not applicable to this case.

 

The learned judge accepted that the damage, if caused, was likely to be severe. He did not find that the damage was of a kind which the animal was likely to cause. If it were necessary to decide this, I would have been disposed to say that it was not of a kind that the animal was likely to cause. However, I go on to sub-clause (b); Mr. Nicholl submitted that this horse was likely to kick if it were among other horses and if another horse was behir it; he further submitted that the characteristics of the animal which are not normally found, that is, the tendency to kick, are to be found in the particular circumstances of being among other horses with one horse approaching from behind. Mr. Nicholl submitted that this case fitted within that definition and he submitted that these characteristics were known to the respondent and that that was why she had a red patch on the tail.

 

In my judgment, firstly, there were no characteristics of this animal to which the likelihood of damage being severe could be due; nor, if it were relevant, to which the likelihood of damage could be due. There were no characteristics which are not normally found in animals of the same species.

 

The question of characteristics arising at a particular time, or in particular circumstances, does not in my opinion arise. This section is dealing with dangerous animals; sub-paragrah (c) requires that these characteristics of the animal should be known to the respondent – that is to say the exceptional characteristics. She was not aware of any such characteristics. She thought that Raffles was a normal young horse, and the judge made this finding:

 

‘In view of my clear and unreserved finding that this horse was a perfectly normal animal, the red patch was in truth more than was necessary’.

 

In my judgment, therefore, the learned judge was correct in saying that there was no substance in any claim under the Animals Act of 1971.

 

There remains the submission that the judge ought to have found that the respondent was guilty of negligence. Mr, Nicholl submitted that when the direction of the hunt changed and the respondent’s position, which had been at the rear of the followers, changed to being near the top, she ought to have remained stationary until the whole of the main body had passed, before she moved. He submitted that the evidence showed that there was a time when she was stationary and that she should have stayed right at the back so that no-one was behind.

 

The respondent denied that Raffles ever stopped. She said that the last thing he would have wanted to have done was to stop, and the judge found, as I have already stated, but I will repeat it.

 

‘Certainly she should, as in my judgment she did, keep when possible to the back of the field in general terms, and where it was practicable to do so let others pass by and be alert to warn others, if necessary, that the horse was young and new to the hunting field’.

 

He said further:

 

‘The rider of a young horse must act reasonably. Mrs. Lampard was trotting along a road where there was a space between the horses and in circumstances when she would have had to stop or turn about in order to get herself wholly to the back of the field. In my judgment, it is putting her duty too high to suggest that she was negligently positioned or acting negligently by riding where and as she did’.

 

Once the judge had found that the horse was not a kicker and that the red patch on the tail did not alter that view, and when he had found, in the words that I have just mentioned, that the respondent was not in breach of the duty of care in any way, it was inevitable that he would find in her favour.

 

I would only add that in arriving at that consideration and finding that the respondent was not negligent, the learned judge had applied the ordinary test of negligence i.e. failing to take reasonable care; but speaking for myself, I would have been disposed to apply a test similar to that laid down by Lord Justice Diplock in Wooldridge v. Sumner, [1963] 2 Queen’s Bench Division, 43, at p.58, namely, whether there was reckless disregard of the safety of others in the circumstances to be found in the hunting field on that occasion.

 

However, that does not arise, and I would dismiss this appeal.

 

LORD JUSTICE LLOYD:

 

Like the judge, I feel considerable sympathy for the appellant in this case. Nevertheless, I agree that the appeal must be dismissed on both the grounds which have been canvassed before us.

 

On the first ground the judge made two findings of fact: First, that the horse was not a kicker in the special sense in which that word is used; and secondly, that any horse is liable to kick, a young horse perhaps being more likely to kick than an old horse.

 

Those findings were amply supported in the evidence given by the defendant, which the judge accepted, and also by the evidence of a Mr. Afford, a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff. They are conclusive of this appeal.

 

But Mr. Nicholl advanced a further ingenious argument in which he sought to turn the second of those two findings of fact in his favour. As I understood it, the argument went like this: Any horse is liable to kick out when approached too closely, or too suddenly, from behind. That is a characteristic of all horses, or at any rate of all young horses, in those circumstances. Those circumstances are particular circumstances within the meaning of s.2(2)(b) of the Act, and therefore the defendant is under strict liability by virtue of that subsection.

 

The short answer to that argument is that which has been given by my Lord; this defendant did not know of that particular characteristic in relation to her horse. The judge accepted her evidence without reservation; it follows that even if the. provisions of s.2(2)(b) are satisfied here, the provisions of s.2(2)(c) are not.

 

But for myself I am still not persuaded that the provisions of s.2(2)(b) would be satisfied in those circumstances. I confess that I find the meaning of the concluding words of that subsection elusive. It was suggested that the purpose of the words was to replace, or re-enact, the effect of the decision in Barnes v. Lucille, Ltd, [1906] 96 Law Times, 680. That decision was expounded by Mr. Nicholl as follows: if an animal shows a vicious propensity in certain circumstances – for example, a bitch with pups – and if the owner knows of that propensity, then he is liable, even though all other animals of that species show that same propensity in those same circumstances.

 

Some support for that submission is to be found in The Modern Law of Animals by Professor G.M. North at p.52, where he says:

 

‘If a species which is normally docile reveals vicious characteristics in certain particular circumstances, then those characteristics, though normal to the species in those circumstances, may be classed as abnormal. An obvious example of such circumstances would be that a female of a species may well, customarily, evidence fierce characteristics in the protection of its young, though generally it is docile’ –

 

and there is then a reference to the case of Barnes v. Lucille Ltd.

 

I am not myself convinced that Barnes v. Lucille goes as far as Mr. Nicholl says. What the case actually decides is that it was no answer to a claim based on the common law doctrine of scienter, that a particular bitch was not vicious at all times but only at particular times. But even if I am wrong about the effect of the decision in Barnes v. Lucille, it does not seem to me to help in the construction of s.2(2)(b) of the Act.

 

It is true that in paragraph 18 of the Law Commission Report No. 13 on Civil Liability for Animals there appears this sentence:

 

‘If the keeper of a bitch with a litter knows that it is prone to bite strangers, then even if this is a common characteristic of bitches at such a time, we think that the keeper should be strictly liable, subject to the permissible defences, which we consider below’.

 

But it is difficult to draw any useful inference from that passage, even if we are permitted to look at it at all, because the clause in the draft Bill annexed to the Commission’s Report is in different terms from the section as subsequently enacted. Clause 2(2) of the draft Bill reads as follows:

 

‘Where damage of any kind is caused by an animal which does not belong to a dangerous species, and -

 

(a) the animal has such characteristics that it is likely, unless restrained, to cause damage of that kind or that any damage of that kind that it may cause is likely to be severe; and

(b) those characteristics are known or treated as known to a person who is a keeper of the animal; that person is liable for the damage except as otherwise provided by this Act’.

 

It will be noted that in the draft clause there is no reference to characteristics not normally found in the species.

 

In the old law there was much debate as to whether the owner of an animal, not being an animal ferae naturae, was liable for injury caused by a vice natural to the species of that animal; those cases are set out conveniently on p.50 of the textbook to which I have already referred.

 

The tendency of those cases was to hold that an owner could be so liable. But all that has now been swept away by s.2(2)(b) of the new Act. The essential condition for liability now is that the characteristic which is known to the owner must be a characteristic which is abnormal for the species. I cannot myself see why, if the old law has been swept away, Parliament should have retained by way of exception the effect of the decision in Barnes v. Lucille if indeed the effect is as Mr. Nicholl contends.

 

If liability is based on the possession of some abnormal characteristic known to the owner, then I cannot see any sense in imposing liability when the animal is behaving in a perfectly normal way for all animals of that species in those circumstances, even though it would not be normal for those animals to behave in that way in other circumstances, for example, a bitch with pups or a horse kicking out when approached too suddenly, or too closely, from behind.

 

In my view the purpose of the concluding words of s.2(2)(b) of the Act may therefore be rather different. They may be designed to meet an argument by an owner:

 

‘My horse did not have any abnormal characteristics even though it was liable to kick out all the time, because all horses are liable to kick out some of the time e.g. when crowded from behind’ -

 

in other words, the concluding words are refining what is meant by abnormality, not imposing a head of liability contrary to the main thrust of s.2(2)(b) of the Act. Otherwise, as it seems to me, one would get this somewhat curious result: Take a horse which kicks out and injures a plaintiff as a result of somebody firing a gun at close quarters. The owner knows of that risk because by chance that very thing has happened before, without injury.

 

The evidence is, as one would expect it to be, that all horses would react in exactly the same way in those circumstances. I cannot believe that Parliament intended to impose a liability in such a case.

 

Fortunately it is not necessary in this case to reach any final decision on the construction of s.2(2)(b) because, for the reason I have already mentioned, even, if s.2(2)(b) was satisfied, s.2(2)(c) was not.

 

On the second point, whether the defendant is liable at common law for negligence, I agree entirely with what my Lord has said and have nothing to add.

 

LORD JUSTICE OLIVER:

 

I also agree, for the reasons which my Lords have given, that the appeal should be dismissed. I only add just a few words in relation to s.2 of the Animals Act.

 

As appears from the terms of the section, it is necessary, in order to establish liability under the section, to demonstrate three things: First of all that the damage is of a kind which the animal, unless restrained, is likely to cause, or which, if caused, is likely to be severe; secondly – and I am paraphrasing now – the likelihood is due to characteristics of that animal that are not normally found in animals of that species, or which are not normally to be found, except at particular times or in particular circumstances; thirdly, that those characteristics are also known to the keeper.

 

In relation to a characteristic which is not infrequently, although not invariably, found in domestic animals of a particular species in particular circumstances, so that the exhibition of that characteristic in those circumstances cannot be said to be abnormal in the species, it is still necessary in my judgment to show that the keeper knew of the existence of that characteristic in the particular animal in those particular circumstances. In my judgment it is not sufficient to say that the behaviour complained of is behaviour which, in the particular circumstances, is sufficiently common to put the keeper on notice that because the animal belongs to the relevant species there is a risk that in the particular circumstances it may prove (there having been no previous knowledge on the part of the keeper that the particular animal is prone so to behave) to be one of those animals which does in those circumstances behave in that way.

 

That, I think, is sufficient to dispose of the instant case, because it is quite evident that this particular defendant did not know of a propensity in this particular horse to behave in that way.

 

The question of whether, in a case where it is common knowledge that all animals of that species exhibit a particular characteristic in particular circumstances that of itself is sufficient to establish liability in the absence of one of the statutory defences in s.5, is one which does not strictly arise in this case; but I am bound to say that for my part I share with my Lord, Lord Justice Lloyd, a puzzlement as to what is the meaning of the section because, like him, I cannot believe that Parliament intended to impose liability for what is essentially normal behaviour in all animals of that species.

 

However, as my Lord has said, it is unnecessary to decide the point, and I prefer to reserve my opinion on it for a case in which it does distinctly arise.

 

For the reasons my Lords have given I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

 

BRATTY v ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NORTHERN IRELAND [1962] AC 386

HOUSE OF LORDS

 

BRATTY v ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NORTHERN IRELAND [1962] AC 386

 

3 October 1961

 

Full text

 

Editor’s comments et cetera in red

 

Editor’s evaluation

 

FACTS The accused killed a girl, with whom he was driving in his car on an errand. He took off her stocking and strangled her with it. He gave evidence that a ‘blackness’ came over him and that ‘I didn’t know what I was doing. I didn’t realise anything.’ He also said that previously he had had ‘feelings of blackness’ and headaches, and there was evidence of his odd behaviour at times, of his mental backwardness and his religious leanings. There was medical evidence that the accused might have been suffering from an attack of psychomotor epilepsy, which is a disease of the mind affecting the reason and which could cause ignorance of the nature and quality of acts done. No other pathological cause for the accused’s acts, or a state of automatism on his part was assigned by medical evidence at the trial. The defences of automatism (i.e. unconscious involuntary action) and of insanity within the M’Naghten rules were raised at the trial. The trial judge refused to leave the defence of automatism to the jury, but left to them the defence of insanity, which the jury rejected. He was convicted of murder. The question was whether the defence of automatism should have been put to the jury.

 

VISCOUNT KILMUIR LC:

Automatism was defined by the Court of Criminal Appeal in this case as connoting the state of a person who, though capable of action,

 

‘is not conscious of what he is doing … It means unconscious involuntary action, and it is a defence because the mind does not go with what is being done.’

It is necessary that a proper foundation be laid before a judge can leave ‘automatism’ to the jury …

… I mean that the defence must be able to point to some evidence … from which the jury could reasonably infer that the accused acted in a state of automatism. Whether or not there is such evidence is a matter of law for the judge to decide …

LORD DENNING:

 

My Lords, in Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions ([1935] All ER Rep – in the Library) Viscount Sankey LC said:

 

‘When dealing with a murder case the Crown must prove (a) death as the result of a voluntary act of the accused and (b) malice of the accused.’

 

The requirement that it should be a voluntary act is essential, not only in a murder case, but also in every criminal case. No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context – some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as ‘automatism’ – means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleepwalking. The point was well put by Stephen J in R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD [in the Library]:

 

‘… can anyone doubt that a man who, though he might be perfectly sane, committed what would otherwise be a crime in a state of somnambulism [sleep-walking], would be entitled to be acquitted? And why is this? Simply because he would not know what he was doing.’

 

The term ‘involuntary act’ is, however, capable of wider connotations: and to prevent confusion it is to be observed that in the criminal law an act is not to be regarded as an involuntary act simply because the doer does not remember it. When a man is charged with dangerous driving, it is no defence for him to say ‘I don’t know what happened. I cannot remember a thing’: see Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 All ER [in the Library]. Loss of memory afterwards is never a defence in itself, so long as he was conscious at the time … Nor is an act to be regarded as an involuntary act simply because the doer could not control his impulse to do it. When a man is charged with murder, and it appears that he knew what he was doing, but that he could not resist it, then his assertion ‘I couldn’t help myself’ is no defence in itself …; though it may go towards a defence of diminished responsibility, in places where that defence is available, see R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 [in the Library]: but it does not render his act involuntary so as to entitle him to an unqualified acquittal. Nor is an act to be regarded as an involuntary act simply because it is unintentional or its consequence are unforeseen. When a man is charged with dangerous driving, it is no defence for him to say, however truly, ‘I did not mean to drive dangerously’ …

 

Another thing to be observed is that it is not every involuntary act which leads to a complete acquittal. Take first an involuntary act which proceeds from a state of drunkenness. If the drunken man is so drunk that he does not know what he is doing, he has a defence to any charge, such as murder or wounding with intent, in which a specific intent is essential, but he is still liable to be convicted of manslaughter or unlawful wounding for which no specific intent is necessary … Again, if the involuntary act proceeds from a disease of the mind, it gives rise to a defence of insanity, but not to a defence of automatism. Suppose a crime is committed by a man in a state of automatism or clouded consciousness due to a recurrent disease of the mind. Such an act is no doubt involuntary, but it does not give rise to an unqualified acquittal, for that would mean that he would be let at large to do it again. The only proper verdict is one which ensures that the person who suffers from the disease is kept secure in a hospital so as not to be a danger to himself or others. That is, a verdict of guilty but insane [now ‘a special verdict that the accused is not guilty by reason of insanity’ - see Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964].

 

Once you exclude all the cases I have mentioned, it is apparent that the category of involuntary acts is very limited. So limited indeed that until recently there was hardly any reference in the English books to this so-called defence of automatism. There … is the singular case of R v Charlson [1955] 1 All ER [in the Library]. Stanley Charlson, a devoted husband and father, hit his ten-year-old son on the head with a hammer and threw him into the river and so injured him. There was not the slightest cause for the attack. He was charged with causing grievous bodily harm with intent, and with unlawful wounding. The evidence pointed to the possibility that Charlson was suffering from a cerebral tumour in which case he would be liable to a motiveless outburst of impulsive violence over which he would have no control at all. Now comes the important point – no plea of insanity was raised, but only the defence of automatism. Barry J directed the jury in these words:

 

‘If he did not what he was doing, if his actions were purely automatic and his mind had no control over the movement of his limbs, if he was in the same position as a person in an epileptic fit and no responsibility rests on him at all, then the proper verdict is ‘not guilty’…’

 

On that direction the jury found him not guilty. In striking contrast to R v Charlson is R v Kemp [[1956] 3 All ER 249 – in the Library]. A devoted husband of excellent character made an entirely motiveless and irrational attack on his wife. He struck her violently with a hammer. He was charged with causing her grievous bodily harm. It was found that he suffered from hardening of the arteries which might lead to a congestion of blood in the brain. As a result of such congestion, he suffered a temporary lack of consciousness, so that he was not conscious that he picked up the hammer or that he was striking his wife with it. It was therefore an involuntary act. Note again the important point – no plea of insanity was raised but only the defence of automatism. Nevertheless, Devlin J put insanity to the jury. He held that hardening of the arteries was a ‘disease of the mind’ within the M’Naghten rules ((1843), 10 Cl & Fin 200) and he directed the jury they ought so to find. They accordingly found Kemp guilty but insane.

 

My Lords, I think that Devlin J was quite right in R v Kemp in putting the question of insanity to the jury, even though it had not been raised by the defence. When it is asserted that the accused did an involuntary act in a state of automatism, the defence necessarily puts in issue the state of mind of the accused man: and thereupon it is open to the prosecution to show what his true state of mind was. The old notion that only the defence can raise a defence of insanity is now gone. The prosecution are entitled to raise it and it is their duty to do so rather than allow a dangerous person to be at large. The Trial of Lunatics Act 1883, s 2, says that where ‘it is given in evidence’ that the person was insane, the jury shall return a verdict of guilty but insane [now ‘a special verdict that the accused is not guilty by reason of insanity’ - see Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964]. It does not say that the defence alone can give such evidence. The prosecution can give it …

 

On the other point discussed by Devlin J namely, what is a ‘disease of the mind’ within the M’Naghten rules, ((1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200 – in the Library) I would agree with him that this is a question for the judge. The major mental diseases, which the doctors call psychoses, such as schizophrenia, are clearly diseases of the mind. But in R v Charlson, Barry J seems to have assumed that other diseases such as epilepsy or cerebral tumour are not diseases of the mind, even when they are such as to manifest themselves in violence. I do not agree with this. It seems to me that any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind. At any rate it is the sort of disease for which a person should be detained in hospital rather than be given an unqualified acquittal.

 

It is to be noticed that in R v Charlson and R v Kemp the defence raised only automatism, not insanity. In the present case the defence raised both automatism and insanity. And herein lies the difficulty because of the burden of proof. If the accused says he did not know what he was doing, then, so far as the defence of automatism is concerned, the Crown must prove that the act was a voluntary act; see Woolmington’s case ([1935] All ER Rep at p 8; [1935] AC at p 482 – in the Library). But so far as the defence of insanity is concerned, the defence must prove that the act was an involuntary act due to disease of the mind; see M’Naghten’s Case ((1843), 10 Cl & Fin at p 210 – in the Library). This apparent incongruity … needs to be resolved. The defence here say: Even though we have not proved that the act was involuntary, yet the Crown have not proved that it was a voluntary act: and that point at least should have been put to the jury.

 

My Lords, I think that the difficulty is to be resolved by remembering that, whilst the ultimate burden rests on the Crown of proving every element essential in the crime, nevertheless in order to prove that the act was a voluntary act, the Crown is entitled to rely on the presumption that every man has sufficient mental capacity to be responsible for his crimes: and that if the defence wish to displace that presumption they must give some evidence from which the contrary may reasonably be inferred. Thus a drunken man is presumed to have the capacity to form the specific intent necessary to constitute the crime, unless evidence is given from which it can reasonably be inferred that he was incapable of forming it … So also it seems to me that a man’s act is presumed to be a voluntary act unless there is evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that it was involuntary. To use the words of Devlin J [in Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 All ER – in the Library] the defence of automatism ‘ought not to be considered at all until the defence has produced at least prima facie evidence’ …

 

What, then, is a proper foundation? … In order to displace the presumption of mental capacity, the defence must give sufficient evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that the act was involuntary. The evidence of the man himself will rarely be sufficient unless it is supported by medical evidence which points to the cause of the mental incapacity. It is not sufficient for a man to say ‘I had a black-out’: for ‘black-out’ as Stable J said in Cooper v McKenna ([1960] QdR at p 419) ‘is one of the first refuges of a guilty conscience, and a popular excuse’. The words of Devlin J in Hill v Baxter … should be remembered:

 

‘I do not doubt that there are genuine cases of automatism and the like, but I do not see how the layman can safely attempt without the help of some medical or scientific evidence to distinguish the genuine from the fraudulent.’

 

When the only cause that is assigned for an involuntary act is drunkenness, then it is only necessary to leave drunkenness to the jury, with the consequential directions, and not to leave automatism at all. When the only cause that is assigned for it is a disease of the mind, then it is only necessary to leave insanity to the jury, and not automatism. When the cause assigned is concussion or sleepwalking, there should be some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred before it should be left to the jury. If it is said to be due to concussion, there should be evidence of a severe blow shortly beforehand. If it is said to be sleepwalking, there should be some credible support for it. His mere assertion that he was asleep will not suffice. Once a proper foundation is thus laid for automatism, the matter becomes at large and must be left to the jury. As the case proceeds, the evidence may weigh first to one side and then to the other: and so the burden may appear to shift to and fro. But at the end of the day the legal burden comes into play and requires that the jury should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the act was a voluntary act.

 

This brings me to the root question in the present case: Was a proper foundation laid here for the defence of automatism apart from the plea of insanity? There was the evidence of the appellant himself that he could not remember anything because ‘this blackness was over me’. He said ‘I did not realise exactly what I was doing’, and added afterwards ‘I didn’t know what I was doing. I didn’t realise anything’. He said he had four or five times previously had ‘feelings of blackness’ and frequently headaches. There was evidence, too, of his odd behaviour at times, his mental backwardness and his religious leanings. Added to this there was the medical evidence. Dr Sax, who was called on his behalf, said there was a possibility that he was suffering from psychomotor epilepsy. It was, he said, practically the only possibility that occurred to him. Dr Walker, his general practitioner, said you could not leave the possibility out of account. Dr Robinson, a specialist, who gave evidence on behalf of the Crown, said he thought it was extremely unlikely that it was an epileptic attack, but one could not rule it out. All the doctors agreed that psychomotor epilepsy, if it exists, is a defect of reason due to disease of the mind: and the judge accepted this view. No other cause was canvassed.

 

In those circumstances, I am clearly of opinion that, if the act of the appellant was an involuntary act, as the defence suggested, the evidence attributed it solely to a disease of the mind and the only defence open was the defence of insanity. There was no evidence of automatism apart from insanity. There was, therefore, no need for the judge to put it to the jury. And when the jury rejected the defence of insanity, they rejected the only defence disclosed by the evidence.

I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

Full text

 

VISCOUNT KILMUIR LC:

 

My Lords, this is an appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland (judgment having been delivered by Lord MacDermott CJ). On 4 May 1961, the appellant was convicted at Downpatrick Assizes of the murder of Josephine Fitzsimmons on 22 December 1960. The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal and by order dated 18 July 1961, his appeal was dismissed. On 27 July 1961, counsel on behalf of the appellant applied, pursuant to the provisions of sub-s (1) and sub-s (2) of s 1 and s 2(1) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960, for a certificate that a point of law of general public importance was involved in the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, and for leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The court certified that the decision involved two points of law of general public importance, namely:

 

‘(i) Whether, his plea of insanity having been rejected by the jury, it was open to the accused to rely on a defence of automatism; and

 

‘(ii) If the answer to (i) be in the affirmative, whether, on the evidence, the defence of automatism should have been left to the jury.’

 

Further it appeared to the court that the points of law so certified ought to be considered by the House of Lords and the court granted leave to appeal to this House.

 

Josephine Fitzsimmons, who was eighteen years old, lived with her widowed mother near Hillsborough in the Monument Road – a road which has been described as lonely and quiet. Her mother had a cousin, Miss Morrow, who resided with her brother at 44, Irwin Place, Donacloney, a village six or seven miles from Hillsborough. With them there lived the appellant, George Bratty, a young man aged about twenty – six. He had been living with the Morrows for about twenty years. On 22 December 1960, the appellant asked Miss Morrow if she would come with him in the car to visit the Fitzsimmons in order to deliver Christmas boxes for Mrs Fitzsimmons and Josephine. The families were in the habit of seeing each other regularly and often. He had a black Ford Popular car in which he and Miss Morrow left Donacloney about 8.20 pm and arrived at Mrs Fitzsimmons’ house about 8.40 pm. Miss Morrow went into the house and after the appellant had turned the car and got out Josephine came out and asked him to drive her into Hillsborough to deliver a message and get some sweets. She was seen in Hillsborough but neither she nor the appellant reached her home again. At 11.15 pm her dead body was found in Grove Road on the grass verge. She had been strangled by a stocking from her left leg. She had not been sexually assaulted but her underpants had been removed and were found with her left boot a short distance from the body on the grass verge. The appellant did not call back to take Miss Morrow home, but drove his car in the direction of Donacloney. When some two or three miles from Donacloney the car broke down and was left at the side of the road, an offer of a tow having been refused. He arrived at Donacloney on foot 4 am. He was found by the police nearly an hour later in a garage at the bottom of the Morrows’ garden and taken to the police station.

 

Shortly after 1 pm on 23 December the appellant was seen by Detective-Head-Constable Russell, Dr Howard of the Forensic Science Laboratory being present. Russell asked what was the cause of two scratches on his neck. The appellant said: ‘It was a young girl did it.’ He was then cautioned and made the following statement:

 

‘Something terrible came over me. When I went up last night to the young girl’s house – turned the car. I had the engine stopped and got out of her. I noticed her coming running out. She asked me to take her down to Hillsborough to get some sweets and deliver a message. I done so and coming back again, just about half ways up the road from her house, I had some terrible feeling and then a sort of a blackness. Just with that I took one look at her, caught her, threw her right over the back of the seat into the back. I caught her with my two hands. When I caught her with my two hands I took one of her stockings and put it round her neck. I tightened the stocking. Afterwards I went down the road a piece – down the road to the left of her house – took her out of the car and left her on the side of the road. Drove on towards home. Half ways down the Ballygowan Road the battery gave up on me. I got help later on to try and get her started. Couldn’t get her started. Then we pushed her into side of a field gateway. I walked home afterwards. I saw a policeman. I went into the garage and the police came. I didn’t mean to do what really happened. Manys a time I took her down to Hillsborough at week-ends and nothing like that ever happened until last night. I apologise for what happened. I don’t think it would have happened only that terrible feeling came over me at the time. I don’t know really what caused it at all. I think that’s about all I can say.’

 

In evidence the appellant later described the terrible feeling that came over him as a feeling that he wanted to put his arms round the girl. Without setting out any further evidence in detail, but having in mind particularly this description of the ‘terrible feeling’, the scratches on the appellant’s neck, and the removal of the underpants, I agree with the Court of Criminal Appeal when they say:

 

‘That the appellant killed Miss Fitzsimmons is not in dispute. On the evidence there can be no doubt at all that he made some sort of advance which was resisted, and that he attacked the girl, breaking a small bone in her neck and then caused her death by taking off one of her stockings and tying it tightly round her neck. It is also beyond question that, at some stage, the appellant got the girl from the front passenger seat to the back of the car, and that it was he who removed the body from the car and dumped it on the grass verge.’

 

In the opening speech for the defence at the trial the jury were asked to find ‘one of three separate and completely independent verdicts’:

 

(i) The primary verdict requested, which it was submitted was the proper one, was that of not guilty on the basis that the appellant ‘was not master of the situation but that he was in a state of automatism’. (The only cause suggested for his being in such a state was psychomotor epilepsy.)

 

(ii) Secondly, if the jury rejected the first defence, then it was submitted that the appellant was incapable of forming the particular intent to constitute murder, that is, an intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, on the ground that ‘his mental condition was so impaired and confused and he was so deficient in reason, that he was not capable of forming this intent’, and that the verdict should be manslaughter.

 

(iii) Thirdly, it was submitted that, if the jury were unable to come to either the first or second verdict,’at the material time the accused may be guilty but he was insane’ on the ground that he did not know the nature and quality of his acts, or if he did, that he did not know that they were wrong.

 

On the first and second of these submissions it was claimed that the appellant should get the benefit of any doubt, the implication being that the Crown must prove that the acts of the appellant were conscious and voluntary acts.

 

The learned trial judge left the defence of insanity to the jury. The insanity alleged was that the appellant was suffering from an attack of psychomotor epilepsy and as a result had such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of his acts or, if he did, not to know that they were wrong. As respects that defence the Court of Criminal Appeal said:

 

‘There is now no complaint of the summing-up as respects this defence, and it is no longer disputed that, on the material before them, the jury were fully entitled to reject it as in fact they did.’

 

The learned judge refused to leave the first and second defences to the jury and it was from this refusal that the main grounds of the appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal and ultimately to this House arise.

 

In his notice of appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal the appellant’s first ground was stated in these words:

 

‘The learned trial judge was wrong in law in failing to leave to the jury the issue as to whether the killing was committed by the appellant in a state of automatism and whether his actions resulting in the said killing were voluntary or conscious.’

 

Automatism was defined by the Court of Criminal Appeal in this case as connoting the state of a person who, though capable of action,

 

‘is not conscious of what he is doing … It means unconscious involuntary action, and it is a defence because the mind does not go with what is being done.’

 

This is very like the words of the learned President of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in R v Cottle ([1958] NZLR at p 1020) where he said:

 

‘With respect, I would myself prefer to explain automatism simply as action without any knowledge of acting, or action with no consciousness of doing what was being done.’

 

The first portion of the argument before them that ‘automatism’ should have been left to the jury was summarised by the Court of Criminal Appeal as being that the whole of the evidence on the issue of insanity was relevant on the issue whether automatism itself existed however it was caused; in view of the onus being on the defence to show on a preponderance of probability that the necessary constituents of the M’Naghten formula [M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200] were present, it was therefore submitted that, although the evidence might have failed to prove some constituent of insanity, the lack of consciousness itself might have seemed a genuine possibility to the jury, and the jury might at least have had a reasonable doubt whether the appellant was conscious of his acts so as to be guilty of murder.

 

Before your Lordships the argument was advanced in this way:

 

1. The ultimate burden on the Crown is to prove that the crime was a conscious and voluntary act.

 

2. There was a volume of evidence showing that the act was not conscious and voluntary.

 

3. The jury should be told to examine this evidence with a view to answering the following questions:

 

A – Are you satisfied that the acts resulting in the death were involuntary or unconscious conduct?

 

B – If this is so you must go on to consider whether this was due to a defect of reason from disease of the mind of such a kind that the defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act, in which case the form of acquittal would be guilty of the acts charged but insane at the time.

 

C – If you are satisfied that the acts were not conscious and voluntary but not satisfied that they are due to a defect of reason from disease of the mind, then the verdict should be not guilty because the prosecution have failed to satisfy you that the acts were conscious and voluntary.

 

D – If you are left in doubt whether the acts were conscious or voluntary then, if the acts were not within the M’Naghten rules, the proper verdict would still be not guilty.

 

The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected that ‘first portion of the argument’ on the ground that the learned judge was right in not leaving to the jury the defence of automatism in so far as it purported to be founded on a defect of reason from disease of the mind within the M’Naghten rules. In this I think that they were right. To establish the defence of insanity within the M’Naghten rules the accused must prove on the preponderance of probabilities first a defect of reason from a disease of the mind, and, secondly, as a consequence of such a defect, ignorance of the nature and quality (or the wrongfulness) of the acts. We have to consider a case in which it is sought to do so by medical evidence to the effect that the conduct of the accused might be compatible with psychomotor epilepsy, which is a disease of the mind affecting the reason, and that psychomotor epilepsy could cause ignorance of the nature and quality of the acts done, but in which the medical witness can assign no other cause for that ignorance. Where the possibility of an unconscious act depends on, and only on, the existence of a defect of reason from disease of the mind within the M’Naghten rulesc, a rejection by the jury of this defence of insanity necessarily implies that they reject the possibility.

 

The Court of Criminal Appeal also took the view that where the alleged automatism is based solely on a disease of the mind within the M’Naghten rulesd, the same burden of proof rests on the defence whether the ‘plea’ is given the name of insanity or automatism. I do not think that statement goes further than saying that when one relies on insanity as defined by the M’Naghten rulese one cannot by a difference of nomenclature avoid the road so often and authoritatively laid down by the courts.

 

What I have said does not mean that, if a defence of insanity is raised unsuccessfully, there can never, in any conceivable circumstances, be room for an alternative defence based on automatism. For example, it may be alleged that the accused had a blow on the head after which he acted without being conscious of what he was doing or was a sleep-walker. There might be a divergence of view whether there was a defect of reason from disease of the mind (compare the curious position which arose in R v Kemp). The jury might not accept the evidence of a defect of reason from disease of the mind, but at the same time accept the evidence that the prisoner did not know what he was doing. If the jury should take that view of the facts they would find him not guilty. But it should be noted that the defence would only have succeeded because the necessary foundation had been laid by positive evidence which, properly considered, was evidence of something other than a defect of reason from disease of the mind. In my opinion, this analysis of the two defences (insanity and automatism) shows that where the only cause alleged for the unconsciousness is a defect of reason from disease of the mind, and that cause is rejected by the jury, there can be no room for the alternative defence of automatism. Like the Court of Criminal Appeal, I cannot therefore accept the submission that the whole of the evidence directed to the issue of insanity should have been left to the jury to consider whether there was automatism due to another cause. It was conceded before this House, and this is stated in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal, that there was nothing to show or suggest that there was any other pathological cause for automatism.

 

I next consider the submission that even so the question of automatism ought to have been left to the jury.

 

Great reliance was placed on a passage in the judgment of North J in the New Zealand case to which I have already referred (R v Cottle ([1958] NZLR at p 1029)). Strictly this passage was obiter in view of the findings on the first two grounds of appeal but its importance is none the less obvious.

 

‘For the reasons I have earlier mentioned, however, as the authorities at present stand he [the judge] could not treat a plea of automatism as something akin to insanity, and therefore subject to the same rule as to the burden of proof, for this would be an unwarranted extension of the rule laid down so positively in Woolmington’s case … On the other hand, in cases like the present one, where the form of the plea is that the prisoner acted unconsciously – in a state of automatism – the rejection of the evidence that he was suffering from a disease of the mind does not wholly dispose of the defence, for it is still possible, though perhaps unlikely, that the jury may not be completely satisfied that the act was the conscious and intended act of the prisoner. In my opinion then, the presiding judge must anticipate this possible situation. He must be careful to tell the jury that – apart from the plea of insanity – the onus of proving all the facts necessary to establish guilt rests on the Crown and remains with the Crown throughout the trial. Consequently, if the jury is of opinion that it has not been made out that the prisoner was suffering from a disease of the mind, if must remember that it is the responsibility of the Crown to satisfy it that the prisoner did know and understand the nature of the act he committed.’

 

If by this passage in his judgment North J meant to imply that in every case where insanity is raised, automatism must always be left to the jury as a defence, I should, with respect, be unable to accept what he says as a correct statement of the law. But what North J said must be considered in the light of the view expressed by the whole court (and set out in the headnote to the report) that not only must automatism be expressly put forward as a defence but also that a proper foundation must be laid for it. In my view the learned judge was only considering the situation where there was positive evidence which would justify a finding by the jury that the accused acted in a state of automatism. This is in accordance with the view taken by this House in Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions in which it was pointed out ([1941] 3 All ER at p 279; [1942] AC at p 12) that the decision in Woolmington’s case did not mean that the judge must deal in his summing-up with the issues of accident and provocation merely because these defences were raised. There must be some evidence of accident or provocation on which a reasonable jury could act. I think that this provides the synthesis between the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the present case and the passage just quoted from North J. It is necessary that a proper foundation be laid before a judge can leave ‘automatism’ to the jury. That foundation, in my view, is not forthcoming merely from unaccepted evidence of a defect of reason from disease of the mind. There would need to be other evidence on which a jury could find non-insane automatism. What the Court of Criminal Appeal say about the onus of proof must be read in the context of evidence directed simultaneously to defences of insanity and automatism.

 

Certain very relevant problems were discussed in Hill v Baxter where the court (Lord Goddard CJ, Devlin and Pearson JJ), held that, in spite of the justices accepting the defendant’s evidence that he became unconscious while driving, there was no evidence which justified the justices in finding that the defendant was not fully responsible in law for his actions. Lord Goddard expressed the view ([1958] 1 All ER at p 195; [1958] 1 QB at p 282) that the onus of proving that the defendant was in a state of automatism was on him because automatism is akin to insanity and further is a fact exclusively within his own knowledge. The other members of the court reserved this point. Nevertheless, Devlin J ([1958] 1 All ER at p 196; [1958] 1 QB at p 284), used these words, with which I respectfully agree and which are relevant to the present case:

 

‘It would be quite unreasonable to allow the defence to submit at the end of the prosecution’s case that the Crown had not proved affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was at the time of the crime sober, or not sleepwalking or not in a trance or black-out.’

 

Later on ([1958] 1 All ER at p 197; [1958] 1 QB at p 285) he continued:

 

‘In my judgment there is not to be found in the Case Stated evidence of automatism of a character which would be fit to leave to a jury … he was not saying that he was a victim of any disease of the mind. Unless there was evidence which showed that his irrationality was due to some cause other than disease of the mind, the justices were not entitled simply to acquit.’

 

I have also read with great interest and profit the Victorian case of R v Carter and the Queensland cases of R v Foy and Cooper v McKenna, Ex p Cooper. I do not think that this is the occasion to pursue the particular facts or the effect of particular statutes but it seems to me that none of the learned judges would question the proposition that, for a defence of automatism to be ‘genuinely raised in a genuine fashion’, there must be evidence on which a jury could find that a state of automatism exists. By this I mean that the defence must be able to point to some evidence, whether it emanates from their own or the Crown’s witnesses, from which the jury could reasonably infer that the accused acted in a state of automatism. Whether or not there is such evidence is a matter of law for the judge to decide. In the case before your Lordships, in my opinion, McVeigh J was right in ruling that there was no evidence on this point fit to be left to the jury.

 

I have already dealt with the unsuccessful attempt to prove psychomotor epilepsy and the concession before us that there was nothing in the evidence to show or suggest that there was any other pathological cause. If one subtracts the medical evidence directed to the establishment of psychomotor epilepsy, I am of opinion that there was not any evidence on which a jury could properly have considered the existence of automatism. Counsel for the appellant directed our attention to the appellant’s statement, to his evidence and to his previous conduct. In my view they do not provide evidence fit to be left to a jury on this question. They could not form the basis of reasonable doubt. McVeigh J did not, therefore, have to consider that direction he would have given to the jury if he had felt that there was evidence fit for them to consider. It is not, strictly speaking, necessary for the decision of this appeal for this House to consider what this direction should have been, but in view of the mention of onus in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal and the argument addressed to us, I think that it is right for me to deal with it.

 

Where the defence succeeds in surmounting the initial hurdle (see Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions and ante p 529, letter H), and satisfies the judge that there is evidence fit for the jury to consider, the question remains whether the proper direction is – (a) that the jury will acquit if, and only if, they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the accused acted in a state of automatism, or (b) that they should acquit if they are left in reasonable doubt on this point.

 

In favour of the former direction it might be argued that, since a defence of automatism is (as Lord Goddard CJ said in Hill v Baxter ([1958] 1 All ER at p 195; [1958] 1 QB at p 282)) very near a defence of insanity, it would be anomalous if there were any distinction between the onus in the one case and in the other. If this argument were to prevail it would follow that the defence would fail unless they established on a balance of probabilities that the prisoner’s act was unconscious and involuntary in the same way as, under the M’Naghten rules ((1843), 10 Cl & Fin 200), they must establish on a balance of probabilities that the necessary requirements are satisfied.

 

Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of the overriding principle, laid down by this House in Woolmington’s case, that it is for the prosecution to prove every element of the offence charged. One of these elements is the accused’s state of mind; normally the presumption of mental capacity is sufficient to prove that he acted consciously and voluntarily and the prosecution need go no further. But, if, after considering evidence properly left to them by the judge, the jury are left in real doubt whether or not the accused acted in a state of automatism, it seems to me that on principle they should acquit because the necessary mens rea – if indeed the actus reus – has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. I find support for this view in the direction given by Barry J to the jury in R v Charlson. In that case the prisoner was charged on three counts, namely, causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder, causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and unlawful wounding. The defence raised the issue of automatism and called medical evidence in support of it. The learned judge, on the basis – which has aroused some discussion – that insanity did not come into the case, after directing the jury that on each of the first two charges the prosecution must prove the specific intent, went on to deal with the third charge, that is, unlawful wounding, in these words ([1955] 1 All ER at p 862):

 

‘Therefore, in considering this third charge you have to ask yourself ‘was the accused knowingly striking his son, or was he acting as an automaton without any control or knowledge of the act …?’… If you are left in doubt about the matter, and you think he might well have been acting as an automaton without any real knowledge of what he was doing, then the proper verdict would be not guilty …’

 

I am also supported by the words of Scholl J in R v Carter ([1959] VR at p 111) where he said:

 

‘It must be for the defence in the first instance genuinely to raise the issue, but if the defence does raise the issue in a genuine fashion then the Crown which, of course, may call rebutting evidence on the matter, is bound in the long run to carry the ultimate onus of proving all the elements of the crime including the conscious perpetration thereof.’

 

My conclusion is, therefore, that once the defence have surmounted the initial hurdle to which I have referred and have satisfied the judge that there is evidence fit for the jury’s consideration, the proper direction is that, if that evidence leaves them in a real state of doubt, the jury should acquit.

 

On the second ground of appeal, that the learned judge was wrong in failing to leave the issue of manslaughter to the jury, I find myself in entire agreement with the words of Lord MacDermott CJ in giving the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal on this point and respectfully adopt his reasoning. I think that this appeal should be dismissed.

 

LORD TUCKER:

 

My Lords, I agree. I also desire to express my agreement with the opinion to be delivered by my noble and learned friend, Lord Morris Of Borth-Y-Gest, which I have had the advantage of reading in print.

 

LORD DENNING:

 

My Lords, in Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions ([1935] All ER Rep at p 8; [1935] AC at p 482) Viscount Sankey LC said:

 

‘When dealing with a murder case the Crown must prove (a) death as the result of a voluntary act of the accused and (b) malice of the accused.’

 

The requirement that it should be a voluntary act is essential, not only in a murder case, but also in every criminal case. No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context – some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as ‘automatism’ – means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleepwalking. The point was well put by Stephen J in 1889:

 

‘… can anyone doubt that a man who, though he might be perfectly sane, committed what would otherwise be a crime in a state of somnambulism, would be entitled to be acquitted? And why is this? Simply because he would not know what he was doing.’

 

see R v Tolson ((1889), 23 QBD at p 187). The term ‘involuntary act’ is, however, capable of wider connotations: and to prevent confusion it is to be observed that in the criminal law an act is not to be regarded as an involuntary act simply because the doer does not remember it. When a man is charged with dangerous driving, it is no defence for him to say ‘I don’t know what happened. I cannot remember a thing’: see Hill v Baxter. Loss of memory afterwards is never a defence in itself, so long as he was conscious at the time; see Russell v HM Advocate; R v Podola. Nor is an act to be regarded as an involuntary act simply because the doer could not control his impulse to do it. When a man is charged with murder, and it appears that he knew what he was doing, but that he could not resist it, then his assertion ‘I couldn’t help myself’ is no defence in itself: see A-G for South Australia v Brown: though it may go towards a defence of diminished responsibility, in places where that defence is available, see R v Byrne: but it does not render his act involuntary so as to entitle him to an unqualified acquittal. Nor is an act to be regarded as an involuntary act simply because it is unintentional or its consequence are unforeseen. When a man is charged with dangerous driving, it is no defence for him to say, however truly, ‘I did not mean to drive dangerously’. There is said to be an absolute prohibition against that offence, whether he had a guilty mind or not (see Hill v Baxter ([1958] 1 All ER at p 195; [1958] 1 QB at p 282) per Lord Goddard CJ), but even though it is absolutely prohibited, nevertheless he has a defence if he can show that it was an involuntary act in the sense that he was unconscious at the time and did not know what he was doing (see HM Advocate v Ritchie, R v Minor and Cooper v McKenna, Ex p Cooper).

 

Another thing to be observed is that it is not every involuntary act which leads to a complete acquittal. Take first an involuntary act which proceeds from a state of drunkenness. If the drunken man is so drunk that he does not know what he is doing, he has a defence to any charge, such as murder or wounding with intent, in which a specific intent is essential, but he is still liable to be convicted of manslaughter or unlawful wounding for which no specific intent is necessary; see Beard’s case [Director of Public Prosecutions v Beard [1920] All ER Rep at pp 25, 27, 30; [1920] AC at pp 494, 498, 504]. Again, if the involuntary act proceeds from a disease of the mind, it gives rise to a defence of insanity, but not to a defence of automatism. Suppose a crime is committed by a man in a state of automatism or clouded consciousness due to a recurrent disease of the mind. Such an act is no doubt involuntary, but it does not give rise to an unqualified acquittal, for that would mean that he would be let at large to do it again. The only proper verdict is one which ensures that the person who suffers from the disease is kept secure in a hospital so as not to be a danger to himself or others. That is, a verdict of guilty but insane.

 

Once you exclude all the cases I have mentioned, it is apparent that the category of involuntary acts is very limited. So limited indeed that until recently there was hardly any reference in the English books to this so-called defence of automatism. There was a passing reference to it in 1951 in R v Harrison-Owen where a burglar, who broke into houses, said he did not know what he was doing. I should have thought that, in order to rebut this defence, he could have been cross-examined about his previous burglaries: but the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled otherwise. I venture to doubt that decision. The next is the singular case of R v Charlson. Stanley Charlson, a devoted husband and father, hit his ten-year-old son on the head with a hammer and threw him into the river and so injured him. There was not the slightest cause for the attack. He was charged with causing grievous bodily harm with intent, and with unlawful wounding. The evidence pointed to the possibility that Charlson was suffering from a cerebral tumour in which case he would be liable to a motiveless outburst of impulsive violence over which he would have no control at all. Now comes the important point – no plea of insanity was raised, but only the defence of automatism. Barry J directed the jury in these words ([1955] 1 All ER at p 864):

 

‘If he did not what he was doing, if his actions were purely automatic and his mind had no control over the movement of his limbs, if he was in the same position as a person in an epileptic fit and no responsibility rests on him at all, then the proper verdict is ‘not guilty’…’

 

On that direction the jury found him not guilty. In striking contrast to R v Charlson is R v Kemp. A devoted husband of excellent character made an entirely motiveless and irrational attack on his wife. He struck her violently with a hammer. He was charged with causing her grievous bodily harm. It was found that he suffered from hardening of the arteries which might lead to a congestion of blood in the brain. As a result of such congestion, he suffered a temporary lack of consciousness, so that he was not conscious that he picked up the hammer or that he was striking his wife with it. It was therefore an involuntary act. Note again the important point – no plea of insanity was raised but only the defence of automatism. Nevertheless, Devlin J put insanity to the jury. He held that hardening of the arteries was a ‘disease of the mind’ within the M’Naghten rules ((1843), 10 Cl & Fin 200) and he directed the jury they ought so to find. They accordingly found Kemp guilty but insane.

 

My Lords, I think that Devlin J was quite right in R v Kemp in putting the question of insanity to the jury, even though it had not been raised by the defence. When it is asserted that the accused did an involuntary act in a state of automatism, the defence necessarily puts in issue the state of mind of the accused man: and thereupon it is open to the prosecution to show what his true state of mind was. The old notion that only the defence can raise a defence of insanity is now gone. The prosecution are entitled to raise it and it is their duty to do so rather than allow a dangerous person to be at large. The Trial of Lunatics Act 1883, s 2, says that where ‘it is given in evidence’ that the person was insane, the jury shall return a verdict of guilty but insane [now ‘a special verdict that the accused is not guilty by reason of insanity’ - see Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964]. It does not say that the defence alone can give such evidence. The prosecution can give it. And in either case inasmuch as the verdict is one of acquittal; see Felstead v R, it should be decided on the balance of probabilities. So it has been held in England that where a man sets up a defence of diminished responsibility, the prosecution are entitled to show that he was insane; see R v Bastian: and conversely when a man sets up insanity, the prosecution are entitled to give evidence of diminished responsibility; see R v Nott.

 

On the other point discussed by Devlin J namely, what is a ‘disease of the mind’ within the M’Naghten rules,((1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200) I would agree with him that this is a question for the judge. The major mental diseases, which the doctors call psychoses, such as schizophrenia, are clearly diseases of the mind. But in R v Charlson, Barry J seems to have assumed that other diseases such as epilepsy or cerebral tumour are not diseases of the mind, even when they are such as to manifest themselves in violence. I do not agree with this. It seems to me that any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind. At any rate it is the sort of disease for which a person should be detained in hospital rather than be given an unqualified acquittal.

 

It is to be noticed that in R v Charlson and R v Kemp the defence raised only automatism, not insanity. In the present case the defence raised both automatism and insanity. And herein lies the difficulty because of the burden of proof. If the accused says he did not know what he was doing, then, so far as the defence of automatism is concerned, the Crown must prove that the act was a voluntary act; see Woolmington’s case ([1935] All ER Rep at p 8; [1935] AC at p 482). But so far as the defence of insanity is concerned, the defence must prove that the act was an involuntary act due to disease of the mind; see M’Naghten’s Case ((1843), 10 Cl & Fin at p 210). This apparent incongruity was noticed by Sir Owen Dixon, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, in an address which is to be found in 31 Australian Law Journal 255 and it needs to be resolved. The defence here say: Even though we have not proved that the act was involuntary, yet the Crown have not proved that it was a voluntary act: and that point at least should have been put to the jury.

 

My Lords, I think that the difficulty is to be resolved by remembering that, whilst the ultimate burden rests on the Crown of proving every element essential in the crime, nevertheless in order to prove that the act was a voluntary act, the Crown is entitled to rely on the presumption that every man has sufficient mental capacity to be responsible for his crimes: and that if the defence wish to displace that presumption they must give some evidence from which the contrary may reasonably be inferred. Thus a drunken man is presumed to have the capacity to form the specific intent necessary to constitute the crime, unless evidence is given from which it can reasonably be inferred that he was incapable of forming it; see the valuable judgment of the Court of Justiciary in Kennedy v HM Advocate (1944 SC (J) at p 177) which was delivered by the Lord Justice-General (Lord Normand). So also it seems to me that a man’s act is presumed to be a voluntary act unless there is evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that it was involuntary. To use the words of Devlin J the defence of automatism ‘ought not to be considered at all until the defence has produced at least prima facie evidence,’ see Hill v Baxter ([1958] 1 All ER at p 196; [1958] 1 QB at p 285); and the words of North J in New Zealand ‘unless a proper foundation is laid,’ see R v Cottle ([1958] NZLR at p 1025). The necessity of laying this proper foundation is on the defence: and if it is not so laid, the defence of automatism need not be left to the jury, any more than the defences of drunkenness (Kennedy v HM Advocate), provocation  (R v Gauthier) or self-defence (R v Lobell) need be.

 

What, then, is a proper foundation? The presumption of mental capacity of which I have spoken is a provisional presumption only. It does not put the legal burden on the defence in the same way as the presumption of sanity does. It leaves the legal burden on the prosecution, by nevertheless, until it is displaced, it enables the prosecution to discharge the ultimate burden of proving that the act was voluntary. Not because the presumption is evidence itself, but because it takes the place of evidence. In order to displace the presumption of mental capacity, the defence must give sufficient evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that the act was involuntary. The evidence of the man himself will rarely be sufficient unless it is supported by medical evidence which points to the cause of the mental incapacity. It is not sufficient for a man to say ‘I had a black-out’: for ‘black-out’ as Stable J said in Cooper v McKenna ([1960] QdR at p 419) ‘is one of the first refuges of a guilty conscience, and a popular excuse’. The words of Devlin J in Hill v Baxter ([1958] 1 All ER at p 197; [1958] 1 QB at p 285) should be remembered:

 

‘I do not doubt that there are genuine cases of automatism and the like, but I do not see how the layman can safely attempt without the help of some medical or scientific evidence to distinguish the genuine from the fraudulent.’

 

When the only cause that is assigned for an involuntary act is drunkenness, then it is only necessary to leave drunkenness to the jury, with the consequential directions, and not to leave automatism at all. When the only cause that is assigned for it is a disease of the mind, then it is only necessary to leave insanity to the jury, and not automatism. When the cause assigned is concussion or sleepwalking, there should be some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred before it should be left to the jury. If it is said to be due to concussion, there should be evidence of a severe blow shortly beforehand. If it is said to be sleepwalking, there should be some credible support for it. His mere assertion that he was asleep will not suffice. Once a proper foundation is thus laid for automatism, the matter becomes at large and must be left to the jury. As the case proceeds, the evidence may weigh first to one side and then to the other: and so the burden may appear to shift to and fro. But at the end of the day the legal burden comes into play and requires that the jury should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the act was a voluntary act.

 

This brings me to the root question in the present case: Was a proper foundation laid here for the defence of automatism apart from the plea of insanity? There was the evidence of the appellant himself that he could not remember anything because ‘this blackness was over me’. He said ‘I did not realise exactly what I was doing’, and added afterwards ‘I didn’t know what I was doing. I didn’t realise anything’. He said he had four or five times previously had ‘feelings of blackness’ and frequently headaches. There was evidence, too, of his odd behaviour at times, his mental backwardness and his religious leanings. Added to this there was the medical evidence. Dr Sax, who was called on his behalf, said there was a possibility that he was suffering from psychomotor epilepsy. It was, he said, practically the only possibility that occurred to him. Dr Walker, his general practitioner, said you could not leave the possibility out of account. Dr Robinson, a specialist, who gave evidence on behalf of the Crown, said he thought it was extremely unlikely that it was an epileptic attack, but one could not rule it out. All the doctors agreed that psychomotor epilepsy, if it exists, is a defect of reason due to disease of the mind: and the judge accepted this view. No other cause was canvassed.

 

In those circumstances, I am clearly of opinion that, if the act of the appellant was an involuntary act, as the defence suggested, the evidence attributed it solely to a disease of the mind and the only defence open was the defence of insanity. There was no evidence of automatism apart from insanity. There was, therefore, no need for the judge to put it to the jury. And when the jury rejected the defence of insanity, they rejected the only defence disclosed by the evidence.

 

I think that Mcveigh J was right in the course he took at the trial, and I find myself in entire agreement with the judgment of Lord MacDermott CJ in the Court of Criminal Appeal. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

 

LORD MORRIS OF BORTH-Y-GEST:

 

My Lords, the Court of Criminal Appeal certified that their decision in dismissing the appellant’s appeal involved two points of law of general public importance. The first was ‘whether, his plea of insanity having been rejected by the jury, it was open to the accused to rely on a defence of automatism’. This raises the question whether a person who by legal tests and standards is sane and who is charged with a criminal offence could be held to be non-accountable for his actions so as to be not guilty of the offence charged against him on the basis that his actions had been unconscious ones and in that sense involuntary. My Lords, I can conceive that this could be so though the cases where such a situation could arise must be very rare. Each set of facts must require a careful investigation of its own circumstances but if, by way of taking an illustration, it were considered possible for a person to walk in his sleep and to commit a violent act while genuinely unconscious, then such a person would not be criminally liable for that act. Apart altogether from any question whether some particular criminal charge requires proof of some particular intent, in the possible case that I have postulated there would be immunity from any conviction for the reason that the act in question could not really be considered to be the act of the person concerned at all.

 

The ‘golden’ rule of the English criminal law that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove an accused person’s guilt (subject to any statutory exception and subject to the special position which arises where it is given in evidence that an accused person is insane) does not involve that the prosecution must speculate as to and specifically anticipate every conceivable explanation that an accused person might offer. The evidence of the commission of certain acts may suffice to prove that they were intentional. In a charge of murder malice may by implication be proved where death occurs as the result of a voluntary act of the accused which is (i) intentional and (ii) unprovoked. When evidence of death and malice has been given an accused person may, however, either by adducing evidence or by examining the circumstances adduced by the Crown, show that his actions were either unintentional or provoked. In such a situation the continuing and constant obligation of the prosecution to satisfy the jury beyond any reasonable doubt is in no way abated (see Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions). In the conceivably possible case that I have postulated (of a violent act committed by a sleepwalker) it would not necessarily be the duty of the prosecution in leading their evidence as to the commission of the act specifically to direct such evidence to negativing the possibility of the act having been committed while sleepwalking. If, however, during the trial the suggested explanation of the act was advanced and if such explanation was so supported that it had sufficient substance to merit consideration by the jury, then the onus which is on the prosecution would not be discharged unless the jury, having considered the explanation, were sure that guilt in regard to the particular crime charged was established so that they were left in no reasonable doubt. The position would be analogous to that which arises where a defence of self-defence is raised. Though the onus is on the prosecution to negative that defence, the obligation to do so only arises effectively when there is a suggestion of such defence (see R v Lobell).

 

Before an explanation of any conduct is worthy of consideration such explanation must be warranted by the established facts or be supported by some evidence that has been given by some witness. Though questions whether evidence should or should not be accepted or as to the weight to be attached to it are for the determination of the jury, it is a province of the judge to rule whether a theory or a submission has the support of evidence so that it can properly be passed to the jury for their consideration. As human behaviour may manifest itself in infinite varieties of circumstances it is perilous to generalise but it is not every facile mouthing of some easy phrase of excuse that can amount to an explanation. It is for a judge to decide whether there is evidence fit to be left to a jury which could be the basis for some suggested verdict.

 

My Lords, the fact that a plea of insanity was advanced on behalf of the appellant did not of itself prevent the raising of alternative or additional matters and in regard to the first point of law presented by the Court of Criminal Appeal I consider that though the appellant’s plea of insanity was rejected by the jury it was ‘open’ to him to rely on the suggested defence which is denoted by the word ‘automatism’.

 

On this basis the second point of law certified by the Court of Criminal Appeal calls for consideration. It was expressed in these words:

 

‘If the answer to (i) be in the affirmative, whether, on the evidence, the defence of automatism should have been left to the jury.’

 

This raises the question whether there was any evidence of ‘automatism’ which was fit to be left to the jury. The argument on behalf of the appellant involved consideration both of the medical evidence and of the non-medical evidence. In his statement made on 23 December 1960, the appellant had spoken of ‘a sort of blackness’ and in his evidence in court he had spoken of a ‘blackness’ having come over him and of previous occasions when he had had feelings of blackness. There were three medical witnesses called (either by the prosecution or by the defence) during the trial. In questions that were put to them and in the course of their evidence the only pathological explanation of what the appellant might have been suffering from that was suggested or in any way canvassed was the possibility that he might have been suffering from psychomotor epilepsy. Psychomotor epilepsy was said to be a functional disorder amounting to defect of reason due to disease of the mind. There was some evidence that during an attack of psychomotor epilepsy a person might commit a violent act unconsciously. There was no medical evidence which was directed to the suggestion of ‘automatism’ other than automatism of an epileptic character. It was, however, urged that in spite of this and notwithstanding that the plea of insanity was rejected the jury should have been told that the medical evidence could still support the view that the appellant though sane had acted unconsciously. It was urged that the jury on a balance of probabilities might not have considered that the appellant was insane but might have had reasonable doubts whether his actions were conscious ones and accordingly had this possible view of the matter been left to them might have returned a verdict of not guilty. The only medical evidence, however, which could lend any support at all to the suggestion that the appellant had acted unconsciously was such evidence as could tend to show that he might have suffered from psychomotor epilepsy – which was a disease of the mind. When the plea of insanity failed the presumption of sanity remained and no medical evidence was adduced which was at all directed to the question whether on the assumption that the appellant was sane he might yet for some reason have acted unconsciously. The submission on behalf of the appellant that the medical evidence could support a plea of automatism so that the jury might have had reasonable doubt whether the actions of the appellant which caused the death were conscious and voluntary involved in effect a repetition of the plea of insanity while endeavouring to avoid the well-established rules as to how insanity must be established.

 

The non-medical evidence which was relied on as supporting the suggestion that the appellant had acted in a state of automatism was the evidence of the appellant himself and all the evidence as to his general behaviour and backwardness and his characteristics and all the evidence relating to the circumstances attending the death of the deceased. The argument for the appellant was that there was evidence on which the jury would have been warranted in finding that the appellant acted unconsciously because he was in a state of automatism which was not due to a disease of the mind and that either on this basis or on the basis of having reasonable doubts whether the actions of the appellant were conscious and voluntary ones the jury would have been warranted in returning a verdict of not guilty. In his statement on 23 December 1960, the appellant gave an account of what he had done. The appellant said in the witness-box that he did not at the time know what he was doing or ‘did not realise exactly’ what he was doing or realize at the time what he had done or did not remember what he had done. He also said that he had not ‘meant to do any harm’. A consideration of his evidence and of the other evidence in the case leads me to the view that it did not provide a proper foundation for a submission that (apart from any question of insanity) the actions of the appellant had been unconscious and involuntary. There was no sufficient evidence, fit to be left to a jury, on which a jury might conclude that the appellant had acted unconsciously and involuntarily or which might leave a jury in reasonable doubt whether this might be so. There was much evidence which showed that the appellant had been and was in many respects backward. He had, however, always been well-behaved and ordinarily he was quiet and kindly: his actions on 22 December 1960, seemed out of keeping with his character. The evidence amply warranted the learned judge in saying to the jury that they

 

‘might think he was an odd fish, an odd fish, this boy – indeed not only as a boy but when he grew up later he was an odd sort of a being, not just quite normal, and that he behaved in these, perhaps minor, ways of abnormality.’

 

However relevant all the evidence so referred to might have been if a different defence than insanity had been available and however relevant it may be in considering questions which are not for your Lordships’ determination, such evidence does not tend to support a plea that the actions of the appellant were unconscious ones. Accordingly I consider that the learned judge at the trial was right in the course that he took.

 

I am in agreement with the reasons given by the Court of Criminal Appeal for concluding that the learned judge was right in not leaving the issue of manslaughter to the jury.

 

I would dismiss the appeal.

 

LORD HODSON:

 

My Lords, I agree with the speech which has been delivered by my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack and also with that which has just been delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Morris Of Borth-Y-Gest.

 

Editor’s evaluation

 

***** This is a leading case. If not quoted in an exam, where relevant, then you are likely to score very badly – if not fail.

 

This is an important case to cite for a couple of reasons.

 

Firstly, in the context of the restrictions to the defence of automatism. For example, that there must be a ‘proper foundation’ for the defence i.e. at least prima facie evidence must be put forward.

 

Secondly, the oft quoted words of Lord Denning, where he indicated that a plea of automatism should be rejected in favour of insanity if there is any suggestion that an involuntary act might recur due to a mental state:

 

‘Suppose a crime is committed by a man in a state of automatism or clouded consciousness due to a recurrent disease of the mind. Such an act is no doubt involuntary, but it does not give rise to an unqualified acquittal, for that would mean that he would be let at large to do it again. The only proper verdict is one which ensures that the person who suffers from the disease is kept secure in a hospital so as not to be a danger to himself or others.’

 

See R v BURGESS [1991] 2 QB 92 – in the Library.

BRADFORD-SMART v WEST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL [2002] EWCA Civ 07

COURT OF APPEAL

 

BRADFORD-SMART v WEST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL [2002] EWCA Civ 07

 

23rd January 2002

 

Full text

 

Editor’s comments et cetera in red.

 

This case has decided the following.

 

(1) The duty of care to prevent bullying usually ends at the school gates.

 

(2) There are specific circumstances where that duty would extend beyond the school gates.

 

(3) The school’s responsibility does not extend to ensuring its pupils arrive home safely.

 

LORD JUSTICE JUDGE:

32. The school does not have the charge of its pupils all the time and so cannot directly protect them from harm all the time. At a day school that charge will usually end at the school gates, although the school will have a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that young children who are not old enough to look after themselves do not leave the school premises unattended…One can think of circumstances where it might go beyond that, for example if it were reasonable for a teacher to intervene when he saw one pupil attacking another immediately outside the school gates. It will clearly extend further afield if the pupils are on a school trip, educational, recreational or sporting. But the school cannot owe a general duty to its pupils, or anyone else, to police their activities once they have left its charge. That is principally the duty of parents and, where criminal offences are involved, the police …

34. The nub of the complaint made on her behalf is not what the school did in relation to Leah herself [the claimant] but what it did not do in relation to the bullies who were pupils in the same school…In general A has no duty to prevent B deliberately causing harm to C. But there are exceptions where A is in control of B: see Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004, at 1055. A day school is not directly in control of the activities of its pupils once they have left its charge: that is the responsibility of their parents …

 

35. The question is whether it was a breach of this school’s duty of care towards Leah to fail to take any action against the pupils she said were bullying her outside school. The usual factors are all relevant in determining what a reasonable school might be expected to do: the extent to which it was foreseeable that failure to do so would result in actual harm to the victim, the extent of the risk, the magnitude of the harm, and the practicability and likely effectiveness of any steps which might be taken … Like any parent, the school will often be faced, in this or in any other context, with the problem of balancing one child’s interests with another’s. There will also be difficult questions of judgment as to how far the school should seek to step in where the parents or other agencies such as the police and social services have not done so. Above all, an ineffective intervention may in fact make matters much worse for the victim because she cannot be protected while she is out of school. It cannot be a breach of duty to fail to take steps which are unlikely to do much good. All of these considerations are also subject to the Bolam principle: if a reasonable body of professional opinion would not take such steps, then this school is not liable for failing to do so.

 

36. Hence, although we accept that a school may on occasions be in breach of duty for failing to take such steps as are within its power to combat harmful behaviour of one pupil towards another even when they are outside school, those occasions will be few and far between…

39. We would dismiss this appeal.

 

Full text

 

LORD JUSTICE JUDGE:

 

1. This is the judgment of the court in an appeal from the decision of Garland J dated 8th November 2000, dismissing the claim for damages for psychiatric injury and consequent loss, brought by a former pupil of Ifield Middle School (IMS), Leah Bradford-Smart, against the defendant council which maintained and was responsible for the school. The alleged cause of her illness and loss was bullying, both within the school and outside it.

 

2. Leah was born on 19th May 1981. Shortly after her birth, her father abandoned her mother, who was left to bring up Leah on her own. She was provided with local authority accommodation on an estate, where, as the judge summarised it, ‘life could at times be uncomfortable’. While living there, between 1985 and 1990 Leah attended the Good Shepherd R.C. Primary School.

 

3 In July 1990 Leah’s mother managed to organise a change of home to two bed-roomed house with a garden in Crawley in Sussex. Although no one could have foreseen it at the time, the move was eventually to make their lives even less agreeable than before. No proceedings were taken by Leah in respect of bullying at the Good Shepherd school. She was removed by her mother a few days before their move to their new home in Crawley. Garland J concluded that Leah had been the victim of bullying at that school, which went beyond a single nasty incident, Leah enrolled at IMS in September 1990. When she started, her mother asked the staff to keep an eye out for bullying. The concern is best encapsulated in a note made of a meeting between Mrs Bradford-Smart, and Leah’s new class teacher, Mrs Cockram, during a parents’ evening in October 1990. It reads:

 

‘Mother thought Leah had settled fairly well into her new school. She was concerned that Leah would come against problems with bullying, as previously. I agreed to watch for any problems.’

 

5. There were some 470 pupils at IMS. The newly appointed headmaster was Paul Harvey. Leah’s class teachers were Mrs Cockram in year 1 (1990-1991) Mrs Reed in year 2 (1991-1992) and Mrs Ashworth in year 3 (1992-1993). In March 1992 Leah was accepted for a place at the Ifield Community College, but in February 1993 her mother determined that she should attend Hazelwick School. Leah left IMS at the end of year 3. In the meantime, as a result of the actions of the mother of another pupil, IMS had received very bad publicity, in the media, on the issue of bullying, and the alleged failure of the school authorities to control it. When her plans for Leah’s attendance at Hazelwick school failed to mature, Mrs Bradford-Smart kept Leah at home and taught her herself for just over a year. She took up complaints of bullying of Leah at IMS with the media. In October 1994, although very young for the placement, Leah started to attend Crawley College, The writ in the present action was issued in April 1998. Leah was nearly 17 years old. The case at trial was that Leah had been bullied at IMS during both year 1 and year 2, and bullied both outside and on the way to and from school, (using public transport) and within the school itself, in year 3. Although Garland J accepted that Leah had been disappointed and unhappy during years 1 and 2, he rejected the contention that she had been bullied at school. As to year 1, Garland J said:

 

‘I cannot conclude from the evidence before me that there was bullying, let alone that the school knew about it and failed to take appropriate action’.

 

As to year 2, he concluded that:

 

‘there was some name-calling and uncouth behaviour on the bus but nothing of the targeted and persistent nature required to constitute bullying’.

 

7. His conclusions in relation to year 3 were:

 

‘I have no hesitation in finding that from July 1992 Leah was seriously bullied at home and on the bus going to and from school. I also find that threats were made as to what would happen in school. ….. In the third year Mrs Ashworth’s defensive actions prevented bullying in school although Leah was fearful as a result of what happened outside school’.

 

He further held that Mrs Ashworth did all that she could as a class teacher ‘to safeguard Leah while she was at school. I do not consider that her conduct fell short of that to be expected of an ordinarily competent class teacher or that she did or failed to do anything which no class teacher of ordinary skill would have done or refrained from doing if acting with ordinary care’.

 

8. These conclusions were criticised by Mr Roger Ter-Haar QC for Leah. He contended that they were wrong and that the erroneous findings were the consequences of the judge’s failure to grapple with the evidence. He made detailed submissions in relation to each of the relevant years, but he laid particular emphasis on two areas of the evidence. The first was the judge’s dissatisfaction with the evidence of the headmaster at IMS, Mr Harvey, which caused him ‘considerable difficulty’, and which he regarded as ‘unreliable’. Second, Mr Ter-Haar focused on the commendations made of Mrs Bradford-Smart by Leah’s three class teachers, as a supportive and sensible parent, not prone to exaggeration. With considerable forensic skill, he proceeded to mount an argument, which carried to its logical conclusion, meant that Mrs Bradford-Smart was a witness whose evidence should have been accepted by the judge. On this basis Garland J’s conclusions were not sustainable.

 

9. While not conceding that the judge’s assessment of Mr Harvey was correct, Mr Edward Faulks QC accepted that he could not restore Mr Harvey’s standing as a credible witness before this court. However, he submitted that Mr Harvey’s inadequacies as a witness did not establish that Leah had been bullied in school. On the second issue, he convincingly demonstrated that it was fallacious to proceed from the respectful, even admiring views, of the teachers about Mrs Bradford-Smart as a mother of a pupil between 1990 and 1993 to the conclusion that they accepted the truth of what she was now saying about events during those three years, or more important, that those views obliged the judge to do so. To illustrate and underline the logic of his submission, he highlighted the evidence of Mrs Ashworth, which was examined in detail.

 

10. Mrs Ashworth accepted without hesitation that Mrs Bradford-Smart was a very caring woman, not over-protective of her daughter, whose contemporaneous complaints did not appear to her to be exaggerated. However, she went on to give evidence that when she had read Mrs Bradford-Smart’s witness statement she could ‘not myself remember the things she said about bullying in school…at the time Mrs Bradford-Smart was not referring to things that were happening in school at all.’

 

11. Her attention was drawn to a letter dated April 1993 where Mrs Bradford-Smart had written: ‘She has been bullied and harassed inside and on her way to and from school constantly by a gang of girls.’ Mrs Ashworth responded that she had seen that letter. ‘I would not have agreed that she was being bullied or harassed inside school’. She accepted that bullying and threats went on outside school, and that these were sufficient, on occasion, to make Leah fearful about going into the playground. On such occasions she allowed Leah to stay in the classroom with her. She was ‘absolutely unwilling to withdraw Leah from where she should have been from the playground, and I felt it was the wrong thing to do, that every time she stayed in with me she had a little less practice in going out and looking after herself. I did not want to keep her in very much, and I did not keep her in more than I could possibly help’.

 

12. She was then asked whether she had seen what Mrs Bradford-Smart had told the newspapers. She said that she had, she ‘was very, very shocked’. She was asked whether she was suggesting that Mrs Bradford-Smart had deliberately told lies to the newspapers. She said she had no opinion on that. Counsel returned to the letter dated April 1993. Mrs Ashworth said ‘I was a bit surprised about that and felt rather let down by it when I read the statement about the letter to Mr Patten, because I had felt that it denigrated the effort I had made to give Leah a happy, progressive year.’ She was then asked: ‘Did you accept then that Mrs Bradford-Smart believed that Leah had indeed been bullied at school?’ She replied: ‘I did not know what Mrs Bradford-Smart believed. I knew what was being expressed’.

 

13. She was asked whether ‘at that stage’ or ‘afterwards’ she considered that Mrs Bradford-Smart had told deliberate lies. After a pause, she responded: ‘All the time I have known Mrs Bradford-Smart I have never doubted anything she had said up to then’.

 

14. These were very careful, deliberate answers. They do not mean that Mrs Ashworth accepted the truth of what Mrs Bradford-Smart was alleging about bullying in school (as opposed to outside school). To the contrary, notwithstanding the measured terms in which her reservations were expressed, Mrs Ashworth was adamant that Leah was not bullied in school. The judge regarded her as an impressive, accurate witness. To the extent that any transcript may do so, it provides ample confirmation for the judge’s assessment. In short, therefore, we do not accept that the commendations made of Mrs Bradford-Smart by the teachers who knew her while Leah was at school means, or should have meant, that Garland J did, or ought to have believed her evidence. Accordingly, Mr Ter-Haar’s detailed analysis of what she said in evidence fails to reinforce his submission that the judge’s conclusions of fact were wrong.

 

15. As a separate argument Mr Ter-Haar relied on the absence of any express judicial finding that Mrs Bradford-Smart or Leah were lying or inaccurate in their evidence. Certainly, the judge did not say so expressly, and we can readily understand why he did not. On his findings, whatever the truth about the issue of bullying in school, Mrs Bradford-Smart and Leah, had both been victims of what he described as a ‘vendetta’ by their neighbours, which began in the summer of 1992. The details need no repetition. It is sufficient to note that false, and extremely serious, allegations were made maliciously against Mrs Bradford-Smart. Despite her complaints, neither the police nor social services had been able to provide any practical assistance to reduce or diminish the difficulties to which she and Leah were being subjected. Mrs Bradford-Smart was a devoted mother, always encouraging her daughter to achieve her best. Leah herself was a talented girl who, on the judge’s findings, had suffered from a depressive illness. She had been a victim of bullying, albeit outside the school.

 

16. In this case brutal language of judicial rejection was not a necessary pre-requisite to the judge’s decision that he should not accept or rely on the evidence of either of these witnesses. What he did say however, clearly indicated his considerable reservations, and the reasons for them. He noted the conflicts of evidence between Leah and her mother. Leah’s evidence was more consistent with the evidence of the teachers. He studied the contemporaneous documents, which Mr Faulks took us through. Although the documents were not complete, they included favourable school reports on Leah throughout her time at IMS, together with warm, but not extravagant praise, and the notes of interviews with parents during the formal evenings which took place throughout Leah’s education at IMS. Significantly, in October 1992, notwithstanding the publicity which had already taken place about bullying at the school, the only record is that Mrs Bradford-Smart was ‘pleased’ with Leah’s progress. In March 1993. the interview records that Leah worked well and that there were ‘no problems in school’.

 

The concern was the non-acceptance at Hazlewick, and the note records that ‘the mother does not want her to go to ICC because of problems with neighbours’ children who are there.’ The judge took account of the unsuccessful campaign started in February 1993 by Mrs Bradford-Smart for Leah to be admitted to Hazlewick, and her consequent disappointment, which formed a significant part of the context in which the allegations of bullying within the school came to be made. The note of the meeting in March 1993 is not consistent with a complaint of bullying within the school but demonstrates the anxiety to achieve a place at Hazlewick.

 

The judge also took as an example of what he concluded was exaggeration made by Mrs Bradford-Smart in a comment subsequently written by her on a letter dated 27th August 1993. She wrote: ‘If this being the case, why on both of the last days of term at Ifield Middle School did Leah get beaten up?’. In his judgment the judge commented that she had made no reference to any such incidents ‘in the course of her evidence, and that the only passage in Leah’s evidence which could possibly refer to any such incident is paragraph 24 of her witness statement in which she says she was attacked by a girl named Emma. The attack could hardly be described as a beating up and Leah seemed to have got the better of it.’.

 

17. Given the judge’s express endorsement of the evidence of Mrs Ashworth, which undoubtedly conflicted with that given by Mrs Bradford-Smart in relation to year 3, not on the issue of bullying generally, but the place where it took place, the judge gave ample indication of the fact that he did not find it possible to rely on the evidence of Leah and her mother, and also the reasons for his inability to do so. It was not necessary in the circumstances of this case for him to do so with any unnecessary or additional emphasis, merely for the sake of effect. There is no doubt that the judge rejected this evidence, and the implied criticism of the sensitive way in which he dealt with it, and made his findings, is not justified.

 

18. Mr Ter-Haar made a number of further submissions about some of the factual issues. For example, he referred to Mrs Cockram’s difficulties with memory, pointing out that it did not follow from her inability to remember something, that the particular incident about which Leah was speaking had not happened. Garland J would not have assumed that it did. Mr Ter-Haar suggested that it was a matter of surprise that Mrs Reed could not remember the publicity surrounding the bullying allegation made by the first girl. Accordingly, as we understand it, he suggested that her memory was deficient, so her inability to remember any bullying of Leah in year 2, should carry no weight. Again, we do not think this point can have been overlooked by Garland J, who expressly noted Mrs Reed’s inability to remember the incident in his judgment.

 

19. It is unnecessary to recite any of Mr Ter-Haar’s further submissions on the facts. Taken separately, or cumulatively, and notwithstanding the justified criticism made of Mr Harvey’s evidence, which was closely considered in its proper context by the judge, the attack on Garland J’s factual conclusions fails.

 

20. In summary therefore, so far as years 1 and 2 are concerned, the question of bullying does not arise for consideration at all. In year 3, the only bullying suffered by Leah was bullying when she was away from the school. The troubles at home began at the very end of year 2 and became more acute during the summer holidays. At the beginning of year 3 Mrs Bradford-Smart confided in Mrs Ashworth that Leah was having troubles with neighbouring children, who were pupils at IMS in Leah’s year. From time to time, while bullying her at home, they also threatened ‘to get Leah when they were all at school together’. Naturally enough this was very alarming, both for Leah and her mother, and approximately every three or four weeks, Mrs Bradford-Smart would send a long chatty letter to Mrs Ashworth asking her to keep an eye out for possible trouble at school in view of threats which had been made.

 

21. Mrs Ashworth was anxious that Leah should be protected, but not over-protected. On the basis of the judge’s findings, she achieved an admirable balance. When Leah was worried, she was permitted to spend the whole or part of break periods in the class with Mrs Ashworth. On other occasions, when Mrs Ashworth observed one or other of the troublesome children hanging about the classroom, they were told to go away. And they did. Their teacher, too, kept an eye out for trouble, and when it seemed likely to arise, distracted them. All these episodes were quickly over, and tensions dissipated as the children then got on with more normal playground activities with friends. Leah herself was not a stranger to the playground, nor friendless. She stayed behind with Mrs Ashworth ‘not more than once a week, but say, every two or three weeks’. For the rest of the time Leah was in the playground as normal, under the watchful eye of Mrs Ashworth whose classroom overlooked the playground, and who had also arranged for those monitoring the playground to keep an eye out for her as well. Apart from the inevitable ups and downs of playground life, Leah appeared to be happy, playing and chatting with her friends, apparently enjoying the breaks. In truth she was a confident girl, well liked by other children, and quite capable herself of ‘putting down’ some of her contemporaries.

 

22. There were a number of specific troubles. On examination, these were unconnected with neighbour troubles at home. There were also the usual disagreements and quarrels, quickly over. But Leah did not speak to Mrs Ashworth of being bullied at school, nor did her mother. And Mrs Ashworth, who was a very experienced teacher, specifically directing her attention to Leah, never saw or became aware of anything to lead to the conclusion that Leah had been victimised at school. Her impression of Leah was that she was ‘a positive child… very well informed… happy to put her view forward. She was happy with her three close friends, and she was also very kind and thoughtful, and I feel that those things together are a sign of a happy child.’

 

23. Mrs Ashworth accepted that she was responsible for the pastoral care of Leah, and concerned that there had been problems outside school. Within the school she said that she: ‘wanted to protect her, but I wanted her to feel more confident about these children and not to be fearful and withdrawn in my classroom. So I sent her out when I did not feel it was essential’ (to keep her in the classroom). She accepted that she felt it was part of her duty ‘to take on board what had happened outside school and be very sure that it did not have consequences inside school’, and she felt that she had succeeded in doing so.

 

24. Toward the end of the year 3 Mrs Ashworth developed concerns about Leah, which she attributed to the uncertainty over her schooling arrangements for the following year. That analysis was not unreasonable, and even if it were wrong, did nothing to undermine Mrs Ashworth’s adamant view that Leah had not been subjected to bullying at school.

 

25. In summary therefore, the bullying which took place at home or on the way to and from school, was not allowed to and did not spill over into school. Leah was closely and affectionately monitored by Mrs Ashworth, who saw to it that any threats raised at home were never fulfilled, and unostentatiously contrived to give Leah the support and encouragement she needed to deal with the problems which confronted her at school. Without the dedication and experience of Mrs Ashworth, or a teacher like her, the problems at home might well have developed into bullying at school. As it was they did not. The judge’s finding was quite explicit and needs no repetition. We shall not interfere with it.

 

26. Mr Ter-Haar’s principal argument, however, was that the judge had applied too restrictive a test in determining the scope of the school’s duty of care towards its pupils. The judge put it this way:

 

‘I have come to the conclusion that granted a school knows that a pupil is being bullied at home or on the way to and from school, it would not be practical let alone fair just and reasonable, to impose upon it a greater duty than to take reasonable steps to prevent that bullying spilling over into the school…. I would regard the duty as going no further than to prevent the bullying actually happening inside the school; in other words, to take effective defensive measures. If the school chooses, as a matter of judgment, to be proactive then that is a matter of discretion not obligation.’

 

27. Mr Ter-Haar argues that it was wrong in principle to adopt a line of demarcation at the school gate. The school owes a duty to take reasonable care to protect its pupils from abuse by other pupils even if this occurs off school premises. As with any other professional duty this is to be judged in accordance with the test laid down in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 5 82: i.e. whether a responsible body of professional opinion would have taken that course.

 

28. It was common ground in this case, as it had been in Van Oppen v Clerk to Bedford Charity Trustees [1990] 1 WLR 235, 250, that ‘a school is under a duty to take reasonable care for the health and safety of the pupils in its charge’. As Croom-Johnson LJ pointed out at 266, in some respects this goes beyond mere parental duty, because the school may have special knowledge about some matters which the parent does not or cannot have: in that case the unusual dangers in playing certain sports, such as rugby football. But otherwise the school is under no greater duty than the parents: in that case to arrange personal accident insurance for its pupils.

 

29. In X v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, at 766, Lord Browne-Wilkinson took the matter a stage further, in the context of whether a claim against the headteacher and members of the Local Education Authority’s advisory service for failing properly to assess and detect the child’s special educational needs should be struck out:

 

‘In my judgment a school which accepts a pupil assumes responsibility not only for his physical well-being but also for his educational needs. The education of the pupil is the very purpose for which the child goes to the school. The headteacher, being responsible for the school, himself comes under a duty to exercise the reasonable skills of a headmaster in relation to such educational needs. If it comes to the attention of the headmaster that a pupil is under-performing, he does owe a duty to take such steps as a reasonable teacher would consider appropriate to try and deal with such under-performance…. If a headteacher gives advice to the parents, then in my judgment he must exercise the skills and care of a reasonable teacher in giving such advice.’

 

30. The scope of a school’s duty of care towards its pupils was summed up thus by Auld LJ in Gower v London Borough of Bromley [1999] ELR 356, at 359:

 

‘(1) A headteacher and teachers have a duty to take such care of pupils in their charge as a careful parent would have in like circumstances, including a duty to take positive steps to protect their well-being…

(2) A headteacher and teachers have a duty to exercise the reasonable skills of their calling in teaching and otherwise responding to the educational needs of their pupils…

(4) The duty is to exercise the skill and care of a reasonable headteacher and/or teachers, applying the Bolam test, namely, whether the teaching and other provision for a pupil’s educational needs accords with that which might have been acceptable at the time by reasonable members of the teaching profession…’

 

This approach was upheld when that case, along with others, reached the House of Lords in Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2000] 3 WLR 776. But Lord Slynn gave this warning, at 792:

 

‘The difficulties of the tasks involved and of the circumstances under which people have to work in this area must also be borne fully in mind. The professionalism, dedication and standards of those engaged in the provision of educational services are such that cases of liability for negligence will be exceptional. But though claims should not be encouraged and the courts should not find negligence too readily, the fact that some claims may be without foundation or exaggerated does not mean that valid claims should necessarily be excluded.’

 

31. Although these are all aspects of the duty of care, there are practical differences between what might be called the ‘health and safety duty’ and the ‘educational’ duty, among them that the latter is more likely to lead to ‘pure’ economic loss. Bullying may be either a ‘health and safety or an ‘educational’ issue or both. It may lead to physical or psychiatric injury to the victim. It may also lead to educational under-achievement and consequent psychiatric injury or economic loss.

 

32. The school does not have the charge of its pupils all the time and so cannot directly protect them from harm all the time. At a day school that charge will usually end at the school gates, although the school will have a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that young children who are not old enough to look after themselves do not leave the school premises unattended: see Lewis v Carmarthenshire County Council [1953] 1 WLR 1439, CA, at 1443 (the speeches in the House of Lords proceeded on the same assumption: see Carmarthenshire Couni Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549). One can think of circumstances where it might go beyond that, for example if it were reasonable for a teacher to intervene when he saw one pupil attacking another immediately outside the school gates. It will clearly extend further afield if the pupils are on a school trip, educational, recreational or sporting. But the school cannot owe a general duty to its pupils, or anyone else, to police their activities once they have left its charge. That is principally the duty of parents and, where criminal offences are involved, the police. There was evidence from Mr Watling, an educational consultant, that some schools do patrol ‘areas of concern’ outside school to prevent incidents after children have left. But we agree with the judge that this is matter of discretion rather than duty.

 

33. The school’s conduct in relation to Leah herself cannot be faulted. Leah was not underachieving at school. Her reports were good. She was one of the brightest pupils in the class, particularly in science, and made a sparkling contribution to class discussions. Her teacher knew about the problems outside school and was taking thoroughly sensible and well balanced steps both to prevent the same thing happening in school and to counteract any effects upon her educational performance and development.

 

34. The nub of the complaint made on her behalf is not what the school did in relation to Leah herself but what it did not do in relation to the bullies who were pupils in the same school albeit in a different class. In general A has no duty to prevent B deliberately causing harm to C. But there are exceptions where A is in control of B: see Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004, at 1055. A day school is not directly in control of the activities of its pupils once they have left its charge: that is the responsibility of their parents. In R v London Borough of Newham ex parte X [1945] ELR 303, at 306-7, Brooke J (as he then was) rejected the argument that a head teacher could not use his disciplinary powers against a pupil who had attacked another boy outside school. We agree. We also agree that there may be circumstances in which a failure to exercise those powers would be a breach of the school’s duty of care to another pupil. We therefore disagree with the very restricted way in which the judge expressed the relevant duty.

 

35. The question is whether it was a breach of this school’s duty of care towards Leah to fail to take any action against the pupils she said were bullying her outside school. The usual factors are all relevant in determining what a reasonable school might be expected to do: the extent to which it was foreseeable that failure to do so would result in actual harm to the victim, the extent of the risk, the magnitude of the harm, and the practicability and likely effectiveness of any steps which might be taken, We also accept the point made by Mr Faulks QC, on behalf of the school, that the school’s duties arise because of its educational duties towards the child. Indeed those duties are also owed to all the other children in the school. Like any parent, the school will often be faced, in this or in any other context, with the problem of balancing one child’s interests with another’s. There will also be difficult questions of judgment as to how far the school should seek to step in where the parents or other agencies such as the police and social services have not done so. Above all, an ineffective intervention may in fact make matters much worse for the victim because she cannot be protected while she is out of school. It cannot be a breach of duty to fail to take steps which are unlikely to do much good. All of these considerations are also subject to the Bolam principle: if a reasonable body of professional opinion would not take such steps, then this school is not liable for failing to do so.

 

36. Hence, although we accept that a school may on occasions be in breach of duty for failing to take such steps as are within its power to combat harmful behaviour of one pupil towards another even when they are outside school, those occasions will be few and far between. Mr Watling agreed that there were differences of view as to how far to go. The experts did agree that where an incident between pupils outside school carried over into school a reasonable headteacher should investigate if it had a deleterious effect upon the victim. In this case there were no adverse effects upon Leah’s educational performance and development clearly attributable to what was going on. There was manifestly impressive evidence from Mrs Ashworth of the steps she did take to protect but not over-protect Leah. It is clear that a responsible body of professional opinion would have agreed that enough had been done. We thus conclude that the judge would have reached the same conclusion had he directed himself a little less restrictively upon the law.

 

37. We would add that in all these cases it is necessary to identify with some precision any breach of duty found. It is also important to consider whether the steps proposed would have been effective in preventing the bullying. It is not enough to find that there has been bullying, to find some breach of duty, and then to find that the bullying caused the injury. There must be a causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury. That will often be difficult to prove.

 

38. There is no magic in the term bullying. Any school has to have sensible disciplinary policies and procedures if it is to function properly as a school at all. It will no doubt take reasonable steps to prevent or deal with one-off acts of aggression between pupils and also recognise that persistent targeting of one pupil by others can cause lasting damage to the victim. In seeking to combat this it is always helpful to have working definitions such as those contained in the documentation we have seen. The problem is now well enough recognised for it to be reasonable to expect all schools to have policies and practices in place to meet it; indeed, this school developed just such a policy in ‘Working Together’. We agree that such policies are of little value unless they are also put into practice. But in order to hold the school liable towards a particular pupil, the question is always whether the school was in breach of its duty of care towards that pupil and whether that breach caused the particular harm which was suffered.

 

39. We would dismiss this appeal.

BRADFORD-SMART v WEST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL [2000] LTL C0100160

QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION

 

BRADFORD-SMART v WEST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL [2000] LTL C0100160

 

Newspaper Articles

 

Daily Telegraph

The Times

The Guardian

 

8th November 2000

 

Editor’s italics. Comments et cetera in red (see Court of Appeal judgment – in the Library).

 

GARLAND J:

 

Leah Bradford-Smart, the Claimant, seeks damages against the Defendant Council for psychiatric injury caused by bullying when she was a pupil at Ifield Middle School between September 1990 and July 1993, a maintained primary school for which the Defendant was responsible …

Leah Bradford-Smart was born on 19th May 1981. Her mother was not married to her father who left when Leah was only a few weeks old. Mrs Bradford-Smart had two adult children of her marriage who had lived with their father since they were very young. The departure of Leah’s father left Mrs Bradford-Smart in difficult circumstances. She was given Local Authority accommodation on an estate where life could at times be uncomfortable, but in July 1990 she was able to negotiate an exchange for a two-bedroom house with a garden in Crawley where she and Leah have lived ever since.

 

It became apparent to Counsel that in order to establish the tort of negligence, a Claimant has to establish a duty of care owed to him or her, breach of that duty and damage recognised by the law caused by the breach … There was, so far as Counsel were aware, no direct authority on liability for bullying … I therefore approach this case as raising issues of principle …

I have no hesitation in finding that from July 1992 Leah was seriously bullied at home [as part of a vendetta against Mrs Bradford-Smart by her neighbours and their relatives] and on the bus going to and from school [by her fellow pupils]. I also find that threats were made as to what would happen in school. However, as I have already indicated, I accept Mrs Ashworth [Leah’s teacher] as a reliable and truthful witness … Mrs Ashworth was continuously in contact with Mrs Bradford-Smart, she was fully aware of what was happening and as a class teacher did all that she could to safeguard Leah while she was at school. I do not consider that her conduct fell short of that to be expected of an ordinarily competent class teacher or that she did or failed to do anything which no class teacher of ordinary skill would have done or refrained from doing if acting with ordinary care.

 

The school had … a policy and procedures which … were thoroughly up to date and satisfactory; Mrs Ashworth allowed Leah to stay with her if she felt threatened; if one of the gang [of bullies] came looking for her, Mrs Ashworth told her to go away; in order not to be over-protective, Mrs Ashworth encouraged Leah to go out and play if she thought it was safe and then kept an eye on her; Leah never made any complaint to her about any occurrence at school, and Mrs Ashworth kept Mr Harvey [the headmaster] fully informed … Mrs Ashworth’s role was essentially a defensive one. The question that lies at the heart of this case is whether the school was under a duty to be proactive, that is, to go out beyond the school gate to the children and their parents in order to prevent or mitigate the bullying to which Leah was being subjected. This is of fundamental importance because I have taken the view that although Leah suffered disappointment and unhappiness during her first two years at school she was not in fact bullied [at school]. In the third year, Mrs Ashworth’s defensive actions prevented bullying in school although Leah was fearful as a result of what happened outside school. It follows that if Leah suffered psychiatric illness caused by bullying … then the causative bullying was at home and on the bus going to and from school, not in the school itself.

… I make no secret of the fact that I find this a most anxious case. Advancing the boundaries of negligence requires the most careful consideration of whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty granted that there is foreseeability of damage and proximity. There was proximity and I have no difficulty with foreseeability: that sustained persecution by third parties can go beyond misery to psychiatric illness. The boundaries of negligence have been moved forward in Gower v London Borough of Bromley [1999] ELR 356 and Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2000] 3 WLR 776. In both cases the extent of the duty and the nature of the particular breach could in my view be ascertained with greater precision than is possible in the present case.

 

Is a school to be concerned with bullying only at the bus stop immediately outside the school gate, on the bus itself or arising from anti-social behaviour between families on a housing estate? A school’s powers are limited to what might best be described as inquiry and counselling which may in certain circumstances exacerbate [make worse] rather than ameliorate [make better] the situation. I have come to the conclusion that granted a school knows that a pupil is being bullied at home or on the way to and from school, it would not be practical let alone fair, just and reasonable, to impose upon it a greater duty than to take reasonable steps to prevent that bullying spilling over into the school

 

I would regard the duty as going no further than to prevent the bullying actually happening inside the school; in other words, to take effective, defensive measures. If the school chooses, as a matter of judgment, to be proactive then that is a matter of discretion not obligation. Talking to the children or to their parents may or may not produce any benefit. Taken to extremes, excluding the bullies from the school, would probably greatly exacerbate the situation. In my judgment, a school cannot reasonably be expected to do more than to take reasonable steps to prevent a child being bullied while it is actually at the school. I have decided that…Mrs Ashworth did take reasonable steps to safeguard Leah while she was actually at school. Accordingly, the claim must fail at this point.

 

 

BRADFORD (MAYOR OF) v PICKLES [1894] AC 587

HOUSE OF LORDS

 

Bradford (Mayor oF) v Pickles [1894] AC 587

 

Editor’s comments in red.

 

LORD HALSBURY:

 

… The only remaining point is the question of fact alleged by the plaintiffs, that the acts done by the defendant are done, not with any view which deals with the use of his own land or the percolating water through it, but is done, in the language of the [plaintiff], ‘maliciously’. I am not certain that I can understand or give any intelligible construction to the word so used …

 

This is not a case in which the state of mind of the person doing the act can affect the right to do it. If it was a lawful act, however ill the motive might be, he had a right to do it. If it was an unlawful act, however good his motive might be, he would have no right to do it. Motives and intentions in such a question as is now before your Lordships seem to me to be absolutely irrelevant. But I am not prepared to adopt Lindley LJ’s view of the moral [blameworthiness] of the person insisting on his right when that right is challenged.

 

[If] the owner of the adjoining land is in a situation in which an act of his, lawfully done on his own land, may divert the water which would otherwise go into the posses­sion of this trading company, I can see no reason why he should not insist on their purchasing his interest from which this trading company desires to make a profit.

 

LORD WATSON:

 

… No use of property, which would be legal if due to a proper motive, can become illegal because it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.

 

LORD ASHBOURNE:

 

… The plaintiffs have no case unless they can show that they are entitled to the flow of water in question, and that the defendant has no right to do what he is doing … [The defendant] has acted within his legal rights through­out; and is he to forfeit those legal rights and be punished for their legal exercise because certain motives are imputed to him? If his motives were the most generous and philanthropic in the world, they would not avail him when his actions were ille­gal. If his motives are selfish and mercenary, that is no reason why his rights should be confiscated when his actions are legal.

 

LORD MACNAGHTEN:

 

… Why should [the defendant], he may think, without fee or reward, keep his land as a store-room for a commodity which the corporation dis­pense, probably not gratuitously, to the inhabitants of Bradford? He prefers his own interests to the public good. He may be churlish, selfish, and grasping. His conduct may seem shocking to a moral philosopher. But where is the malice? [The defendant] has no spite against the people of Bradford. He bears no ill-will to the corporation. They are welcome to the water, and to his land too, if they will pay the price for it … But the real answer to the claim of the corporation is that in such a case motives are immaterial. It is the act, not the motive for the act, that must be regarded. If the act, apart from motive, gives rise merely to damage without legal injury, the motive, however reprehensible it may be, will not supply that element.

BRACKEN (1) TRICKETT (2) v BILLINGHURST [2003] EWHC 1333 (TCC)

QUEENS BENCH DIVISION

 

TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT

 

BRACKEN (1) TRICKETT (2) v BILLINGHURST [2003] EWHC 1333 (TCC)

 

10 June 2003

 

Full text

 

HIS HONOUR JUDGE DAVID WILCOX:

BACKGROUND

 

2. The claimants entered into a contract for building works at 1 Hurst Road, Horley, Surrey on 26th March 2001… The Contractor was described as Graham Billinghurst of Advance Building Technology Limited.

 

3. The architect/contract administrator was Mark Pellant and architect of Koru Design.

 

4. Clause 2.1 of the Contract provided that work would commence 31st March 2001 and that the works would be completed by 13th July 2001. A dispute arose as to costs of additional temporary structural propping works. The Contractor left the site until the Employer agreed to bear the costs. The Employer thereupon determined the employment of the Contractor and the Contract. A dispute arose and under Article 6 of the… agreement it was referred to adjudication. KA Slegg Esq. was duly appointed.

10, The Adjudicator found that the contract was … entered into by Mr Billinghurst personally and not by the company. …

 

11. He awarded the claimants £9,099.68 and ordered that the defendant should pay £235 in respect of the Adjudicator’s nomination fee, and £4,071.38 70% of the Adjudicator’s total fee of £5,825.

 

12. The claimants embarked upon a second adjudication to recover the costs of completing the building works. The defendants submitted that the contract was between Advance Building Technology Limited (ABT Limited) that they had done at the earlier adjudication. The Adjudicator declined to consider the matter holding himself bound by the decision of the first Adjudicator

 

13. The second adjudicator made an award of £31,274.9 L to be paid to the claimants by the 21st May 2002 and awarded interest at the rate of 9% thereafter. He ordered the respondent to pay his fee of £680 plus VAT and the nomination fee of £235.

 

14. The claimants’ application is for summary judgment in the sum of the two awards together with accrued interest amounting to a total of £43,984.66.

15. On the 22nd August 2002 the first complainant Mr Bracken wrote to the defendant proposing a settlement:

 

‘Dear Graham

 

OUR ONGOING DISPUTE

 

‘I feel that the time has come in this long and protracted dispute to propose to you a settlement so that the whole case can be dropped.

 

‘As you know we have now been through two adjudications which have essentially found totally in our favour and as a result of those you owe us a considerable amount of money. We have now come to the point where we look to enforce the, adjudication and we have now sought council’s (sic) opinion and a great deal of legal advice to consider our next move. I see from correspondence from your solicitor that you are taking similar action …

… I want to give you the option now to pay us a settlement figure so we can all walk away from this dispute and we can end any dealing with you.

 

As you appreciate from the correspondence which has gone back and forth we have had to incur all the adjudicator’s costs, even though a high proportion of these had been apportioned, to you. In addition to this, the adjudicator has also found that you are liable for the difference between the two contracts, which is a considerable amount of money.

 

I therefore make the proposal to you that we should drop the whole case immediately on receipt of a figure of £6,000. This, of course, goes nowhere near to recouping the costs that we have had to incur on this project as a result of your actions (although the Adjudicator has awarded us), but I am inclined to feel that life is short we all need to move on and not have these issues hanging over our heads. Therefore I am suggesting the six thousand figure primarily because I feel it covers the costs incurred by us in paying the Adjudicator that work apportioned to you. …

 

I hope you feel able to accept this figure, but if not I will instruct my legal team to continue this dispute and I will do all I can to discredit you and your business. All of this has the potential of getting very unpleasant and I hope you consider logic in is settling this matter now…’

18. … [T]he defendant’s solicitors wrote to Mr Bracken on the 6th September 2002 … It was made clear from the subject heading of the letter that their client was Advance Building Technology Limited and this was made clear beyond doubt on the second page of the letter:

 

‘My client which for these purposes is ABT Limited (represented by Mr Billinghurst) does accept that a pragmatic approach is required to bring this unfortunate matter to an end …

 

19. The letter then went on to make a very clear counter offer on behalf of Advance Building Technology Limited:

 

‘My client, however, is not willing to pay this sum of £6,000 but will come close to that figure. We are therefore instructed to forward immediately to you the cheque for the sum of £5,000 on the strict understanding that this sum is offered to you in full and final settlement of all issues between yourself, Mr Billinghurst and Advance Building Technology Limited in relation to all matters of dispute concerning 1 Hurst Road Hawley. The payment is tendered as a compromise settlement. The payment is tended as an offer of settlement which will deemed to have accepted by you and therefore be contractually binding if it is presented to your bank and cleared for payment. If you are not willing to accept the payment on these terms, would you please return the payment and we will assume therefore that the dispute will have to continue.

 

‘I should make it clear of course that this offer applies to both yourself and Ms Trickett and the enclosed cheque is made out to you both jointly. In the circumstances, neither of you would be entitled to pursue this matter any further upon payment in of the cheque.’

 

20. A considerable time lapsed before the cheque was presented for payment. It was presented on the 23rd September 2002 and cleared on the 24th. On the 26th September 2002 Mr Bracken wrote on behalf of himself and Ms Trickett:

 

‘Dear Graham

 

Further to our letters of 22nd and 30th August 2002 I am writing to inform you that I hereby withdraw all previous offers of settlement made on behalf of myself and Anne. I am advised that I am entitled to the full amount awarded to me by the Adjudicators and I now intend to pursue the full amount of the claim unless payment is made in full’.

 

21. Mr Bracken gave evidence before me at the preliminary hearing confirming what he had said in his statement of evidence namely that he had the benefit of informal advice from a criminal silk. In consequence he changed his legal advisors from James R Knowles who mindful of having the benefit of two adjudicators awards were nonetheless ‘far from positive about (his) prospects’ Doubtless they were aware that a valid adjudication award is only final pending the ultimate resolution of the disputes by agreement, arbitration or litigation as appropriate…

22. Construction of a document is a matter of law. …

 

23. Mr Bracken … candidly accepted in evidence that the wording in the letter of the 6th September was clear to him and on receipt of that letter he, as anyone objectively considering the offer, must have appreciated that it was made by ABT Limited, a third party, in order to settle all disputes in relation to building works … against Mr G Billinghurst. The payment was clearly made by the solicitors as agents for their clearly described client ABT Limited and after almost three weeks of possession was then cashed without demur by the claimants.

 

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

27. In Hirachand Punanchand and others v. Temple (1911) 2 KB page 330 C.A. the Court of Appeal upheld the defendant’s appeal against the judgment in favour of the plaintiffs at first instance. There Indian money lenders had advanced sums of monies to a young army officer against a promissory note and upon the security of a bond. He could not pay. The plaintiffs sought payment from his father who offered an amount less than the debt in full settlement of his son’s debts and enclosed a draft for that amount. The plaintiffs cashed the draft and retained the proceeds of the draft and brought an action against the debtor for the balance. Fletcher Moulton LJ at page 340 said:

 

‘In the present case you are dealing with the question in respect of money paid by a third person. In such a case there is no difference between payment of the total amount and payment of a proportion of it only, so long as it is paid in settlement of the debt. If a third person steps in and gives consideration for the discharge of the debtor, it does not matter whether he does it in meal or in malt, or what proportion the amount given bears to the amount of the debt. Here the money was paid by a third person, and I have no doubt that upon acceptance of that money by the claimants, the full knowledge of the terms on which it was offered, the debt was absolutely extinguished.

 

CONCLUSION

29. … The counter offer admits of only one construction. Namely, that it was an offer made by a third party, and that the presentation and encashment of that cheque paid on behalf of the third party by its agent’s solicitors constituted the clearest acceptance of that offer… (see Hirachand Punanchand and others v. Temple).

 

30. … The defendant has a complete defence to the claimants’ claim. …

Full text

 

HIS HONOUR JUDGE DAVID WILCOX:

 

1. This matter originally came before me as a Part 24 claim. The claimants sought summary judgment to enforce two adjudication awards. It was apparent from the defence filed and the supporting documentation, that the claims may have been the subject of compromise. The Part 24 application was therefore adjourned to enable the issue as to compromise to be determined, and to give the parties the opportunity to adduce oral evidence.

 

BACKGROUND

 

2. The claimants entered into a contract for building works at 1 Hurst Road, Horley, Surrey on 26th March 2001, using a JCT Agreement for Minor Works 1998 Edition incorporating amendments one and paragraph 2. The Contractor was described as Graham Billinghurst of Advance Building Technology Limited.

 

3. The architect/contract administrator was Mark Pellant and architect of Koru Design.

 

4. Clause 2.1 of the Contract provided that work would commence 31st March 2001 and that the works would be completed by 13th July 2001. A dispute arose as to costs of additional temporary structural propping works. The Contractor left the site until the Employer agreed to bear the costs. The Employer thereupon determined the employment of the Contractor and the Contract. A dispute arose and under Article 6 of the standard Agreement for Minor Building Works it was referred to adjudication. KA Slegg Esq. was duly appointed.

 

5. As a preliminary issue he considered who was the appropriate respondent to the reference. Mr Billinghurst contended that the Contractor was Advanced Building Technology Limited. All correspondence had been on the company headed writing paper, and the architect/administrator addressed his instructions to the company and referred to the Company as being the contractor in all correspondence with the claimant’s solicitors James R. Knowles.

 

6. On the 20th August 2001 the architect wrote to the defendant’s solicitors saying

 

‘I acknowledge receipt of your letters dated 10th August 2001 and 17th August 2001.

 

‘My letter dated 15th August 2001 was addressed and directed toward ABT Limited and is not a response to your first letter. My letter was a statement of the facts in a request for recovery of materials removed by your client and not returned to site.

 

‘I remind you that your letter advised that it was not necessary for me to respond directly to you. The employer has not yet seen your first letter as you failed to send them a copy. The decision to determine the employment of ABT Limited was made prior to my receipt of your letter

 

ABT was in default of the contract by suspending the carry out of the works without due cause for a period of 35 days. The contract makes provision for seven days within which to end the default. Since this time your client has maintained that no work could be progressed until after temporary propping works had been concluded …. The employer thus decided to determine the employment of ABT Limited under Clause 7.2.1 of the contract an action they could have taken 28 days earlier …

 

7. The anticipated initial costs of completing the works will be as follows: increase in labour and material costs over the last 10 months (since ABT Limited submitted its tender) additional preliminary costs to the new contractor to familiarise with the project and set up on site and …………. costs incurred by the new contractor for completing another contactor’s job.’ Emphasis provided

 

8. On the 4th December 2001 the claimants’ then solicitors James R. Knowles wrote to Advance Building Technology Limited in the following terms:

 

‘We have been retained by Ms Anne Tricket and Mr A Bracken to represent their interests in the determination of your employment concerning the extension at 1 Hurst Road, Hawley …’ emphasis provided

 

9. Apparently neither of the architect/administrator or the claimants solicitors were under any doubt as to proper identity of the employer and con tractor under the contract.

 

10, The Adjudicator found that the contract was in fact entered into by Mr Billinghurst personally and not by the company. This was a decision within the competence of the Adjudicator under the reference.

 

11. He awarded the claimants £9,099.68 and ordered that the defendant should pay £235 in respect of the Adjudicator’s nomination fee, and £4,071.38 70% of the Adjudicator’s total fee of £5,825.

 

12. The claimants embarked upon a second adjudication to recover the costs of completing the building works. The defendants submitted that the contract was between Advance Building Technology Limited (ABT Limited) that they had done at the earlier adjudication. The Adjudicator declined to consider the matter holding himself bound by the decision of the first Adjudicator

 

13. The second adjudicator made an award of £31,274.9 L to be paid to the claimants by the 21st May 2002 and awarded interest at the rate of 9% thereafter. He ordered the respondent to pay his fee of £680 plus VAT and the nomination fee of £235.

 

14. The claimants’ application is for summary judgment in the sum of the two awards together with accrued interest amounting to a total of £43,984.66.

 

THE PRELIMINARY ISSUE: was there an agreement to compromise the claims?

 

15. On the 22nd August 2002 the first complainant Mr Bracken wrote to the defendant proposing a settlement:

 

‘Dear Graham

 

OUR ONGOING DISPUTE

 

I feel that the time has come in this long and protracted dispute to propose to you a settlement so that the whole case can be dropped.

 

As you know we have now been through two adjudications which have essentially found totally in our favour and as a result of those you owe us a considerable amount of money. We have now come to the point where we look to enforce the adjudication and we have now sought council’s (sic) opinion and a great deal of legal advice to consider our next move. I see from correspondence from your solicitor that you are taking similar action …

… I want to give you the option now to pay us a settlement figure so we can all walk away from this dispute and we can end any dealing with you.

 

‘As you appreciate from the correspondence which has gone back and forth we have had to incur all the adjudicator’s costs, even though a high proportion of these had been apportioned, to you. In addition to this, the adjudicator has also found that you are liable for the difference between the two contracts, which is a considerable amount of money.

 

‘I therefore make the proposal to you that we should drop the whole case immediately on receipt of a figure of £6,000. This, of course, goes nowhere near to recouping the costs that we have had to incur on this project as a result of your actions (although the Adjudicator has awarded us), but I am inclined to feel that life is short we all need to move on and not have these issues hanging over our heads. Therefore I am suggesting the six thousand figure primarily because I feel it covers the costs incurred by us in paying the Adjudicator, that work apportioned to you. …

 

‘I hope you feel able to accept this figure, but if not I will instruct my legal team to continue this dispute and I will do all I can to discredit you and your business. All of this has the potential of getting very unpleasant and I hope you consider logic in is settling this matter now…’

 

16. On the 30th August 2002 Mr Bracken wrote to the defendant’s solicitors:

 

‘Dear Mr Arscott

 

Reference: Your letter dated 23rd August 2002 – Graham Billinghurst

 

Thank you for your letter of 23rd August 2002 in response to my letter sent directly to Graham Billinghurst. I am pleased to see he’s taking my offer seriously and I obviously hope that he accepts the compensation figure of £6,000 as a way of resolving this issue immediately’.

 

17. He went on to express the hope that Mr Billinghurst would agree to the settlement of £6,000 in order that no further contact with legal parties was necessary and that the matter could be dealt with expeditiously.

 

‘You have obviously indicated in your letter that I can hope to receive response in the week commencing Monday 2nd September 2002. I therefore think that it makes sense to ask you to make a decision by Friday of that week and I hope that Graham is able to confirm that he is willing to pay us compensation of £6,000. I have thought hard about the amount of money which I wish to receive in order to resolve this and I am not prepared to accept any figure less than the amount quoted’.

 

18. As promised the defendant’s solicitors wrote to Mr Bracken on the 6th September 2002 and indicated that there were other monies which were outstanding to their client for which it should be given credit. It was made clear from the subject heading of the letter that their client was Advance Building Technology Limited and this was made clear beyond doubt on the

second page of the letter:

 

‘My client which for these purposes is ABT Limited (represented by Mr Billinghurst) does accept that a pragmatic approach is required to bring this unfortunate matter to an end but most certainly without acceptance of liability.

 

19. The letter then went on to make a very clear counter offer on behalf of Advance Building Technology Limited:

 

‘My client, however, is not willing to pay this sum of £6,000 but will come close to that figure. We are therefore instructed to forward immediately to you the cheque for the sum of £5,000 on the strict understanding that this sum is offered to you in full and final settlement of all issues between yourself, Mr Billinghurst and Advance Building Technology Limited in relation to all matters of dispute concerning 1 Hurst Road Hawley. The payment is tendered as a compromise settlement. The payment is tended as an offer of settlement which will deemed to have accepted by you and therefore be contractually binding if it is presented to your bank and cleared for payment. If you are not willing to accept the payment on these terms, would you please return the payment and we will assume therefore that the dispute will have to continue.

 

‘I should make it clear of course that this offer applies to both yourself and Ms Trickett and the enclosed cheque is made out to you both jointly. In the circumstances, neither of you would be entitled to pursue this matter any further upon payment in of the cheque.’

 

20. A considerable time lapsed before the cheque was presented for payment. It was presented on the 23rd September 2002 and cleared on the 24th. On the 26th September 2002 Mr Bracken wrote on behalf of himself and Ms Trickett:

 

‘Dear Graham

 

Further to our letters of 22nd and 30th August 2002 I am writing to inform you that I hereby withdraw all previous offers of settlement made on behalf of myself and Anne. I am advised that I am entitled to the full amount awarded to me by the Adjudicators and I now intend to pursue the full amount of the claim unless payment is made in full’.

 

21. Mr Bracken gave evidence before me at the preliminary hearing confirming what he had said in his statement of evidence namely that he had the benefit of informal advice from a criminal silk. In consequence he changed his legal advisors from James R Knowles who mindful of having the benefit of two adjudicators awards were nonetheless ‘far from positive about (his) prospects’ Doubtless they were aware that a valid adjudication award is only final pending the ultimate resolution of the disputes by agreement, arbitration or litigation as appropriate. Mr Stephen Fairburn a legal executive from his newly instructed solicitors also wrote a letter dated the 26th September 2002:

 

‘… It is unclear who is making the payments. Our clients are not prepared to accept payment of this sum of £5000 from Mr Billinghurst in settlement of their claim against him which amounts to £48,217.95 following two adjudication awards made in their favour or enter into the compromise proposed for which there is no apparent consideration. Our clients accept the payment of £5000 only on account of Mr Billinghurst’s indebtedness to them. Our clients have written to Mr Billinghurst confirming that their offer to settle is withdrawn.

 

‘It seems to us that your client is Mr Billinghurst as shown on your letterhead and as shown on the reverse of the cheque. The payment has not been accepted as payment made on behalf of the third party nor is the payment made on behalf of Advance Building Technology Limited who you claim to be your client for these purposes’ whatever that may mean …’

 

22. Construction of a document is a matter of law. When considering whether an agreement exists, and if so its ambit, a court is entitled to consider the factual matrix.

 

23. Mr Bracken gave oral evidence. He candidly accepted in evidence that the wording in the letter of the 6th September was clear to him and on receipt of that letter he, as anyone objectively considering the offer, must have appreciated that it was made by ABT Limited, a third party in order to settle all disputes in relation to building works including but not limited to those the subject of the adjudications made against Mr G Billinghurst. The payment was clearly made by the solicitors as agents for their clearly described client ABT Limited and after almost three weeks of possession was then cashed without demur by the claimants.

 

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

 

24. The offer ‘in full and final settlement’ of the dispute is made at the time the cheque is sent. There must be clear evidence of actual or potential disputes at that time. The presentation of the cheque may amount to an acceptance of the offer giving rise to an accord. In Day v. McLean (1889) 22 QBD 610 at page 613 Bowen LJ said:

 

‘If a person sends a sum of money on the terms that it is to be taken, if at all, in satisfaction of a larger claim; if the money is kept, it is a question of fact as to the terms upon which it is so kept. The accord and satisfaction imply an agreement to take money in satisfaction of the claim in respect of which it is sent. If accord is a question of agreement, there must be either two minds agreeing or one of the two persons acting in such a way as to induce the other to think that the money is taken in satisfaction of the claim, and according to act upon that view’.

 

25. In either case it is a question of fact, of course where there is documentation as in this case the construction of such documentation is a matter of law and will give rise to facts which are part of the material events which must then be judged objectively by the court. See Stow Valley Builders v. Stuart (1974) 2 Lloyds Reports p. 13 C.A. where Lloyd I,J said:

 

‘As with any other bilateral contract what matters is not what the creditor himself intends but what by his words and conduct he has led the other party as a reasonable person … to believe’.

 

26. Also in that judgment Lloyd LJ expressed a view is to the significance of the encashment of a cheque:

 

‘Cashing the cheque is always strong evidence of acceptance especially if it is not accompanied by immediate rejection of the offer. Retention of the cheque without rejection is al so strong evidence of acceptance depending on the length of delay But neither of these factors are conclusive; and it would … be artifice al to draw a hard and fast line between cases where payment is accompanied by an immediate rejection of the offer and, cases w, sere objection comes within a day or two days’.

 

27. In Hirachand Punanchand and others v. Temple (1911) 2 KB page 330 C.A. the Court of Appeal upheld the defendant’s appeal against the judgment in favour of the plaintiffs at first instance. There Indian money lenders had advanced sums of monies to a young army officer against a promissory note and upon the security of a bond. He could not pay. The plaintiffs sought payment from his father who offered an amount less than the debt in full settlement of his son’s debts and enclosed a draft for that amount. The plaintiffs cashed the draft and retained the proceeds of the draft and brought an action against the debtor for the balance. Fletcher Moulton LJ at page 340 said:

 

‘In the present case you are dealing with the question in respect of money paid by a third person. In such a case there is no difference between payment of the total amount and payment of a proportion of it only, so long as it is paid in settlement of the debt. If a third person steps in and gives consideration for the discharge of the debtor, it does not matter whether he does it in meal or in malt, or what proportion the amount given bears to the amount of the debt. Here the money was paid by a third person, and I have no doubt that upon acceptance of that money by the claimants, the full knowledge of the terms on which it was offered, the debt was absolutely extinguished.

 

CONCLUSION

 

28. The original offer made by the claimant made it clear that a response was to be as soon as possible, and in his letter of the 30th August 2002 he said he looked forward to hearing from the defendant’s solicitors as to the offer by the 6th September 2002 within the week. In relation to the counter offer of the 6th September 2002 indicating further areas of dispute, the claimants received the cheque tendered on behalf of the company on the 7th September and delayed by retaining it until presentation on the 23rd September 2002. Neither the claimant nor his solicitor wrote until the 26th September indicating the basis upon which the cheque had already been presented and encashed.

 

29. Had the offer of compromise been made by Mr Billinghurst the defendant, I would have had no difficulty in concluding that there was accord, because the claimants had acted in such a way as to induce the defendant to thinking that the money was taken in satisfaction of the claims in dispute, and had caused him to act on that view. However, that is not the position when one considers the clear terms of the counter offer set out in the letter of the 6th September of 2002. The counter offer admits of only one construction. Namely, that it was an offer made by a third party, and that the presentation and encashment of that cheque paid on behalf of the third party by its agent’s solicitors constituted the clearest acceptance of that offer of compromise (see Hirachand Punanchand and others v. Temple).

 

30. The claimants’ application for summary judgment is misconceived. The defendant has a complete defence to the claimants’ claim. I do not intend to embark upon a consideration of the second award, and a second adjudicator’s refusal to consider who were the proper parties to the contract.

 

31. The claimants will pay costs of both the summary judgment application and the preliminary issue hearing on a standard basis.

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